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In the Matter of Comment by PLAINS ELECTRIC GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION COOPERATIVE, INC.

Concerning Possible Interference by Centaur Broadcasting, Inc., KMAP-FM, Albuquerque, N. Mex.

 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

 

32 F.C.C.2d 479

 

RELEASE-NUMBER: FCC 71-1156

 

NOVEMBER 10, 1971

 


OPINION:

 [*479]  GENTLEMEN: This is in reference to your letter of June 2, 1971, in which you comment upon the question of possible electromagnetic interference in the Sandia Crest area near Albuquerque, New Mexico, that may be created by the operation of station KMAP-FM.

Your comments fail to include "relevant technical data and an engineering analysis establishing and evaluating the proximity interference" you anticipate will be created by the operation of station KMAP-FM, as required by section 1.70(c) of the Commission's rules.  The Commission has no basis, therefore, for finding that interference will, in fact, be caused by the station, In addition, the permittee of the station, Centaur Broadcasting, Inc., states that:

* * * it is prepared to take any reasonable measures required to "eliminate or minimize the expected interference" which can be caused by its (the station's) operation.  To the extent that such action may require the installation of filters and similar equipment, the permittee will, of course install such equipment.

Accordingly, the Commission believes that any problem as to potential interference has been satisfactorily resolved.

Commissioner Johnson concurred in the result.  Commissioner Reid was absent.

 

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMISSION, BEN F. WAPLE, Secretary.


 

CONCURBY: JOHNSON (IN PART)

 

CONCUR:

SEPARATE STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER NICHOLAS JOHNSON CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART

The Federal Communications Commission in renewing the license of WSNT-AM, Sandersville, Georgia, today revisits an old issue -- the proper role of the private attorney general in the Commission's processes.  In my judgment the Commission has again turned its back on the plight of the citizen advocate.

 [*480]  By now it seems fair to conclude that this Commission has never really learned the stern lessons set out by the U.S. Court of Appeals in the celebrated Church of Christ litigation.

Twice this Commission went out of its way to trample citizens' rights in renewing the license of a Southern station entwined in a bitter racial dispute.  And twice this Commission was reversed in the Church of Christ cases that have since become classics in Administrative Law.  Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359 F. 2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("Church of Christ I"); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("Church of Christ II").  These decisions stress the importance of participation by responsible listening groups in license renewal proceedings before the FCC.  They make it quite clear that filing by responsible citizen advocates, as well as the encouragement of private agreements, are important keystones for advancing the public's interest in improved broadcaster performance.

Since these decisions this Commission had paid scant attention to the Circuit Court's clear command.  As then Circuit Judge Burger, now the Chief Justice of the United States, wrote in Church of Christ II: "We did not intend that intervenors representing the public interest be treated as interlopers." Id. at 546 (1969).

I.

By its action today in WSNT-AM the Commission stands once again against the rising tide of the public interest law movement now sweeping the legal profession.  The Commission's stand cannot long hold in the face of the current judicial and legislative trend.  See, Shayon, Renewal Rangers, Saturday Review, August 21, 1971, at 28.  I have elsewhere documented this new current in the law.  See, N. Johnson, A New Fidelity to the Regulatory Ideal, 59 Geo. L.J. 869 (1971). See also, Note, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 Yale L.J. 1069 (1970). The movement in our regulatory process is decidedly toward more strong and independent public interest advocacy in order that the law's vaunted adversary process can be balanced in fact, instead of gruesomely dominated, as it now is, by the corporate elite. Geo. L.J., supra, at 896-901.

Yet we continue to cling to what Judge Burger has characterized as a curious "neutrality-in-favor-of-the licensee." Church of Christ II, supra, at 547.

This dubious "neutrality" (which has done little to encourage intelligent citizen participation) was never more evident than last fall in a Commission decision that forms the questionable foundation for today's action in WSNT.  In September 1970, the Commission by a 4-3 vote (Chairman Burch, Commissioners Cox and Johnson dissenting) refused to approve an agreement that would have allowed television station KTAL-TV in Texarkana, Texas to reimburse the United Church of Christ for expenses the Church had incurred in helping local blacks oppose the station's license renewal.  KCMC,Inc., 25 F.C.C. 2d 608, 605 (1970). The Church dropped the costly fight after the station had promised to improve black hiring and programming.  See KCMC, Inc., 19 F.C.C. 2d 109 (1969).

 [*481]  If the Commission had chosen to approve the $15,000 reimbursement, it could have set a powerful precedent encouraging local public interest groups to fight as private attorney generals in forcing stations to do what the FCC is unable or unwilling to do: upgrade their performance.

The U.S. Department of Justice has said of the Commission's decision in KCMC, Inc:

The United States believes that the Commission's ruling frustrates the public participation which this Court held was vital in Church of Christ I and II.  It constitutes a rejection of Commission policy followed for many years in closely analogous situations of approving the reimbursement of legitimate and prudent expenses of a withdrawing party when the settlement agreement between the parties is in the public interest.  The Commission by invoking the criterion of necessity has used an erroneous legal standard that misconceives the Commission's obligations to advance the public interest and is at variance with standards elsewhere in the Communications Act.  Under the appropriate standard of consistency with the public interest, the Commission's findings and reasoning are inadequate to support its result, especially in light of its failure to consider readily available protective devices * * * to safeguard the public interest against possible abuses of reimbursement agreements.  (Brief of the U.S. Department of Justice at 8, United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., No. 24, 672 (D.C. Cir., filed April 1971))

 

In short, the Commission erred in KCMC, Inc. -- for the substantial reasons outlined above by the Justice Department -- and it errs again today in WSNT, Inc., a closely analogous case.

Because the "private attorney general" concept is so central to sound public participation in the renewal process I propose to explore the facts and the policy behind this particular case at some length below.

I concur in part and dissent in part to the Commission's action.  I concur in the renewal of the license for WSNT, Inc., but I dissent to our denial of the petitioner's request for reimbursement of $1,931.60 in expenses incurred in the processing of the petition to deny WSNT's renewal.

II.

I concur in the granting of the petition for reconsideration of our order designating for hearing WSNT's renewal application because the issues specified in the hearing order have been satisfactorily resolved with the new community ascertainment by WSNT.  We have accepted the new ascertainment and the agreement between WSNT and the citizens' group (intervenors) as an amendment to WSNT's renewal application.  The agreement will eliminate any misconceptions the licensee may have had concerning its broadcast responsibilities.  It will clarify its policies and eliminate any future misunderstandings.  Therefore, I do not object to the granting of the license renewal.

However, I dissent to the Commission's denial of the intervenors request for reimbursement of expenses, because with this decision the Commission will further those adverse effects which I warned of in KCMC, 19 F.C.C. 2d 109 (1970) (dissenting opinion).  I fear the denial in KCMC, Inc., and today's action in WSNT, Inc., will make it much more difficult for citizens' groups to become active participants in the regulation of our broadcast licenses.

In KCMC, Inc., the Commission refused to approve a voluntary agreement to reimburse a citizens' group for its legitimate expenses.   [*482]  With its action today in WSNT, Inc. the Commission carries a bad precedent one step further.

As I will detail below, I believe this Commission had ample authority and precedent to order the reimbursement of community groups in legitimate cases.

III.

The WSNT case began on December 31, 1969, when the licensee asked for renewal.  On March 2, 1970, Arnold Hayes, representing the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and Richard Turner, representing the Black Youth Club of Sandersville, Georgia, filed a petition to deny renewal.  The petitioners claimed that the licensee, in his radio news presentation, had discriminated against the blacks of Sandersville (who represent approximately 60 per cent of the population).  The licensee refused to broadcast any information about the blacks' lawful campaign to improve their economic, political, and social environment.  This campaign had been the subject of stories on television network news and the national wire services.  Yet WSNT did not give any news coverage to these events.  In addition the licensee did not provide the black community with broadcast services equal to those provided the white community.  WSNT broadcast 26 basketball games and 11 football games played by the predominately white high school, but it did not broadcast any of the sports events of the all black high school.  Finally, the petitioners claimed that the licensee's ascertainment did not reflect the needs and interests of the community.  Of the 26 people interviewed only four black (60 per cent of population is black), and none of the interviewees mentioned the legitimate campaign that was affecting the community and making national news.  The Commission eventually designated this renewal application for hearing on March 11, 1971.  WSNT, Inc., 27 F.C.C. 2d 993 (1971).

Subsequent to this hearing designation, the licensee and intervenor agreed to resolve their differences.  Basically the agreement provided that WSNT would take a more balanced racial approach with its programming and employment.  The intervenors gave their support to WSNT's petition for reconsideration and urged the Commission to grant the renewal application of WSNT.

Today the Commission responds by granting the WSNT renewal.  In doing so the Commission supposedly reaffirms the policy it announced in KCMC, Inc., supra, at 109:

We believe that this Commission should encourage licensees to meet with community oriented groups to settle complaints of local broadcast service.  Such cooperation at the community level should prove more effective in improving local service than would be the imposition of strict guidelines by the Commission.

I wholeheartedly support this concept, and have tried to make it an integral part of our broadcast regulation.  Nevertheless, I believe that the action of the Commission in denying the request for reimbursement in this case, coupled with the majority's precedent in KCMC, Inc., supra, can only discourage the very process of local negotiation and settlement the Commission purports to advance.

The reason WSNT did not agree to reimburse the intervenors clearly rests on Commission precedent in KCMC.  WSNT must have known that the Commission would not approve such an agreement.  Furthermore, it must have been quite obvious to the licensee that the Commission  [*483]  majority would not order reimbursement.  Why would the Commission order reimbursement when we refused to approve a voluntary plan of reimbursement?  Clearly, there was no incentive for the licensee to agree to reimburse.  The licensee obviously was willing to accommodate only those claims which he thought would jeopardize his renewal application.

IV.

On the broadcast level, it is important to set out what the Commission's role is and what it should be in the renewal process.

James Landis, the late Dean of the Harvard Law School and the administrative law authority, stressed that the administrative process was originally designed "to plan, to promote, and to police" the regulated industries on behalf of the public interest. J. Landis, The Administrative Process 15 (1938) (emphasis supplied).  In the Commission's renewal process, as I noted in KCMC, Inc., 25 F.C.C. 2d at 617, there are three possibilities for structuring the policing task:

1.  The Commission's staff can do the job.  But partly through lack of will and partly through lack of manpower and money, the Commission has rarely been able to give adequate attention to policing.

2.  Another option is to encourage community groups and the growing alliance of consumer federations and citizens' lobbies to perform the agencies' work.  This is sometimes called the "private attorney general" concept, and I have had the opportunity to explore this theory at some length.  [See, Geo. L., article cited above.]

3.  The final option, of course, is that no one does anything if the Commission itself or private attorney generals do not take up the challenge.

If the Commission had been of a mind to do so, there are at least three strong legal rationale for ordering the reimbursement of a private attorney general when the licensee and a citizens' group have come to a private agreement upgrading the broadcasters' community service:

(a) The Commission's affirmative duty to encourage citizen participation which stems from the Church of Christ I and II precedents;

(b) As a fiduciary of a valuable public resource, the licensee is liable for the costs incurred by the public in bringing the licensee to account for his neglect of a public trust; and

(c) Ample Commission precedent in closely analogous reimbursement cases.

Affirmative Duty.  The Church of Christ I case leaves little doubt as to the value and desirability of public participation in the renewal process.  In stressing the need for citizen activity, Church of Christ I said:

Public participation is especially important in a renewal proceeding, since the public will have been exposed for at least three years to the licensee's performance, as cannot be the case when the Commission considers an initial grant, unless the applicant has a prior record as a licensee.  In a renewal proceeding, furthermore, public spokesmen, such as appellants, here, may be the only objectors.  Id. at 1004.

 

Church of Christ II carried the point considerable further toward requiring the Commission to foster and maintain a pro-citizen attitude.  As then Circuit Judge Burger wrote, "The Commission * * * [has] an affirmative duty to assist in the development of a meaningful record which can serve as the basis for the evaluation of the licensee's performance of his duty to serve the public interest." (emphasis supplied)  [*484]  Church of Christ II at 548.  The only way known under the adversary process for developing a "meaningful record" is to put the private attorney general on a par with the corporate elite he faces when challenging a broadcaster.  What this means in substance, then, is the active encouragement of public counsel -- and their appropriate financing -- by the Commission in every phase of its regulatory activity.  Anything less falls short of the spirit of the "meaningful record" Judge Burger posited as the appropriate Commission goal for a balanced adversary process.

Public Trust.  A strong public trust argument also makes it entirely appropriate and legally compelled that licensees bear the expenses of private attorney generals.  As a "proxy or fiduciary" of a valuable public resource, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969), the broadcaster is liable for the costs incurred by the beneficiary (i.e., the listening public) in bringing the broadcaster to account for his neglect of the public trust. Cf., Scott, Trusts, Vol. II, §  245 (1956).  This public trust theory is deeply engrained in the legislative history of even the most recent amendments to the Communications Act of 1934.  S. Rep. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-9 (1956) ("* * * broadcast frequencies are limited and, therefore, they have been necessarily considered a public trust.").  The Church of Christ litigation likewise uses trust analogy.  Church of Christ I at 1003 ("* * * a broadcast license is a public trust subject to termination for breach of duty"); Church of Christ II at 548 ("* * * broadcasters are temporary permittees -- fiduciaries -- of a great public resource * * *").

It is further argued that as the owners of the airwaves, 47 U.S.C. §  301, public intervenors are seeking to protect their "equity" interest against the licensee's mismanagement and are entitled to recover their costs where substantial benefits are realized. E.g., Mills v. Electric Autolite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). And the licensee, as the greatest beneficiary of the 1934 Communications Act's licensing scheme, should bear the costs of policing the licensing scheme.  Schedule of Fees, F.C.C. 70-694, 35 Fed. Reg. 10988, 10989 (1970). (See also, Brief of the Petitioners at 8A In Re WSNT, Inc., Dkt. No. 19167 (June 1971)).

Commission Precedent.  While the Commission had not dealt specifically with the private attorney general problem before KCMC, Inc., there exist both a relevant statute and a body of Commission case law involving reimbursement agreements in closely analogous circumstances.  Congress provided in the 1934 Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §  311 (c), that where two or more applicants for a construction permit reach a settlement agreement involving withdrawal by one of the applicants, the Commission shall approve the agreement if it is consistent with the public interest in the matter.  Section 311(c)(3) anticipates that reimbursement of the expenses of the withdrawing applicant will be part of such agreements, and it makes clear that such reimbursement is consistent with the public interest so long as it is an "* * * amount determined by the Commission to have been legitimately and prudently expended and to be expended * * *" in connection with the application.  NBC, Inc., 25 P & F Radio Reg. 67 (1963). This reimbursement policy has had its application in other communications fields through ample Commission precedent.  See,  [*485]  Premier Television, Inc., 9 P & F Radio Reg. 397 (1953) (new station); Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. F.C.C., 225 F. 2d 511, 519-520 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (Circuit Court approved reimbursement practice); Lompoc Valley Cable T.V., Inc., 1 F.C.C. 2d 66 (1965) (CATV reimbursement); Bettervision Systems, Inc., 11 F.C.C. 2d 967 (1968) (CATV reimbursement).  In its most recent case, barely six weeks before the Commission's KCMC decision, the Commission in National Broadcasting Co., 19 P & F Radio Reg. 634 (1970) approved an agreement whereby Voice of Los Angeles withdrew its competing application for NBC's license in Los Angeles in exchange for NBC's payment of over $100,000 costs.  The Commission said: "* * * fairness dictates that Voice should be permitted to withdraw and be reimbursed by NBC." Id. at 636.

In short, the Commission's actions in KCMC, Inc. and today in WSNT, Inc. are inconsistent with the Commission's clear policy in closely analogous cases of approving reimbursement of legitimate and prudent expenses when a settlement agreement between the parties is otherwise consistent with the public interest.

V.

There is little merit to the majority's contention that approval of such expenses would encourage "opportunists" to file frivolous petitions to deny.  There is not a shred of evidence to support such fears offered in the majority's argument or in the record in this case.  On the contrary, the record in this case reveals just the kind of public interest performance which the Commission stated it wanted to encourage.

When and if abuses arise, the Commission can deal with them at that time and in a variety of ways.  It could set a flat ceiling on the amount of expenses to be derived in a case where petitioners are successful in forcing the licensee to make improvements.  There could be a very close scrutiny by the Commission of the expenses claimed.  In any event, the problem, if it someday exists at all, is neither before us now nor insoluble -- as Commission precedents in the cases cited supra amply indicate.

In sum, because of the firm precedents in Church of Christ I and II; because a licensee has a fiduciary's duty to maintain a public trust; because of the many closely analogous Commission case decisions; and because the entire sweep of administrative law today points toward more vigorous public participation in agency law-making, I conclude that this Commission can -- and should -- order the reimbursement of $1,931.60 in expenses to WSNT's petitioners.  Our failure to so order in KCMC, Inc., and WSNT, Inc. works to frustrate the spirit of public participation required by Church of Christ I and II.  ("The Public Intervenors, who were performing a public service under a mandate of this Court, were entitled to a more hospitable reception in the performance of that function.  * * * [An] ally was regarded as an opponent." Church of Christ II at 548.) I had hoped for better.


APPENDIX:

TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER FCC 71-814 AT VOL. 31 FCC 2D 1080 ORDER FCC 71-814 AT VOL. 31 FCC 2D 1080


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