In Re
Complaint by SOCIALIST WORKER PARTY 1972, NEW YORK, N.Y.
Concerning
Equal Opportunity Under Section 315 Re Metromedia, Inc.
39 F.C.C.2d 89
RELEASE-NUMBER: FCC 72-924
OCTOBER 12, 1972
OPINION:
[*89] MR. LARRY SEIGLE,
National Campaign Manager, Socialist Workers Party 1972, Campaign Committee,
706 Broadway, 8th Floor, New York, N.Y.
DEAR MR. SEIGLE: This is in response
to your letters of August 5, 10 and 29, 1972 concerning various equal time
requests for Socialist Workers Party Candidates.
In your correspondence you state
that the then Democratic Party Vice Presidential candidate, Senator Thomas
Eagleton, appeared on the "Merv Griffin Show" on July 27; that his
appearance was a "use" under Section 315 of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended; and that Andrew Pulley, Vice Presidential candidate of the
Socialist Workers Party requested equal time from Metromedia, Inc. within seven
days of the first prior use. You note that subsequent to the application
for equal time, Senator Eagleton withdrew as a candidate for Vice
President. You state that Metromedia, Inc. denied Mr. Pulley's request
for equal time because it believed that the withdrawal of Senator Eagleton made
the request moot. In opposition to Metromedia's position you assert:
It is clear that the claimant
becomes entitled to equal opportunity at the time he submits his request,
provided that all the criteria of Section 315 are met. Thus as of July
28, Mr. Pulley was entitled to equal time. How can this right be revoked,
several days later by subsequent events? In theory, had Metromedia
responded immediately to the request, Mr. Pulley could even had been granted
his equal time before Senator Eagleton's withdrawal. The licensee's
obligation to provide equal opportunity, already incurred, cannot be removed
because of what subsequently happens to the candidate who appeared.
You declare that at the time Mr. Pulley
asked for equal time the Socialist Workers Party had filed for ballot status in
15 states and been certified in six states; that the Socialist Workers Party
has collected nearly 500,000 signatures on nominating petitions; that its
candidates have toured the nation; that its campaign literature has been
distributed nationwide; and that its campaign activities have been covered by
the press and national radio and television networks. You state that Mr.
Pulley has "established a national showing of a bona fide campaign,
regardless of particular state laws." You conclude that he "should be
entitled to equal time in all of the outlets that carried the July 27 Eagleton
appearance." You further note that [*90] dates for certifying candidates
for the ballot vary widely from state to state and that in many states the
deadline for filing nominating petitions is several months before the date on
which final certifications are issued. You ask when candidates for President
and Vice President, other than those of the two major parties, become subject
to Section 315. You claim that the national showing by Mr. Pulley and the
Socialists Workers Party of his bona fide candidacy should be enough to
establish that he is a legally qualified candidate under Section 315.
In your correspondence you included
articles which acknowledge that the Socialist Workers Party candidate for
President, Ms. Linda Jenness, is 31 years old and the Vice Presidential
candidate, Mr. Pulley, is 21 years old. You claim that despite the fact
that both candidates fail to meet the presidential minimum constitutional age
requirement of 35, n1 Ms. Jenness and Mr. Pulley are
legally qualified candidates and should be granted equal time. You state
that presidential elections are protected by the U.S. Constitution and cite
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1971) to support your contention; that the
Twentieth Amendment, Section 3 of the Constitution provides the procedure to be
followed in the event of the election of a President or Vice President who is not
qualified to take office; that the Twentieth Amendment gives Congress the power
to provide by law for the case where neither the President nor Vice President
has qualified before the time fixed for the beginning of their terms; that the
Supremacy Clause, Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that the
Constitution takes precedence over other state laws; that legislative history
shows that the framers of the Twentieth Amendment foresaw the possible
selection of a disqualified President-elect or Vice President-elect and decided
to give people an opportunity to actually vote for persons ineligible to take
office. You state:
n1 Article II, Section I, Clause 4
of the United States Constitution states that "No person except a natural
born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall
any person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained the Age of
thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the United
States." Further Article XII of the Constitution provides that "...
no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be
eligible to that of Vice President of the United States."
It is interesting to note that
candidate Jenness comes within the terms of the last phase of Section 3,
Amendment XX. The next presidential term will begin on January 20,
1973. (Amendment XX Section 1.) Linda Jenness will reach the age of 35 within
the next presidential term. Thus, if she is elected, she will then
qualify to take office on her thirty-fifth birthday. (Of course this
assumes that no constitutional amendment is passed lowering the age requirement
between her election and the beginning of the next presidential term. If
such an even occurred she would then take office earlier than her thirty-fifth
birthday.)
You further state:
It is clear, therefore, that
Constitutional Amendment, and subsequent Congressional action, has preempted
this area and provided the course to follow should an underaged president be
elected. The solution is left to Congress. Therefore, any attempt
by the networks to deny Jenness or Pulley equal time on the grounds of their
failure to meet the age limit set by the Constitution would be an impermissible
infringement on their Constitutional rights.
In telephone conversations with
members of the Commission's staff you stated these constitutional arguments are
now pending before an Ohio court.
[*91] In further correspondence,
you state that Ms. Jenness asked the National Broadcasting Company and the
Mutual Broadcasting system for equal time to reply to those networks' broadcast
of a speech made by Democratic Party nominee George McGovern on August 5, 1972;
that NBC denied your request because Ms. Jenness is under 35 years of age and
has not established that she is a legally qualified candidate for the
presidency of the United States; and that Mutual Broadcasting System denied
your request on the basis that the appearance of Senator McGovern was a news
broadcast and exempt from the equal time regulation. In reply you state
that "the decision of both networks infringe on Linda Jenness' right, as a
bona fide candidate for the presidency of the United States, to equal
time..."
In another matter involving a
candidate of your party, you state that on April 26, 1972 Congressman Roman C.
Pucinski, Democratic Party candidate for United States Senate from Illinois,
appeared on station WTTW, Chicago; that Fred Halstead the Socialist Workers
Party candidate for the same office asked WTTW for equal time; that Mr.
Halstead is "in the process of complying with the state requirement to
appear on the ballot"; and that the licensee of WTTW demanded a letter
from the Secretary of State of Illinois declaring that Mr. Halstead was a
legally qualified candidate as evidence of Mr. Halstead's bona fide
status. You claim that the Secretary of State has no statutory authority
nor is competent to rule on the bona fide character of a candidate: that his
sole function in Illinois with regard to elections "is to order the
placing on the ballot of those candidates who have met the requirements under
state law"; that Illinois law did not allow Mr. Halstead to file his
signatures until well after the appearance of Congressman Pucinski; that Mr.
Halstead has collected 40,000 signatures and is carrying on a serious campaign;
and that "If for any reason, he should be unsuccessful in his attempt to
be listed on the ballot, he will run a vigorous write-in campaign." You
further state:
If the Commission were to hold that
a candidate who is in the process of getting on the ballot can only qualify for
equal time after his certification by the Secretary of State, the Commission
would be discriminating against those candidates who try to meet the ballot
requirements, and in favor of those who content themselves with write-in
campaigns, since a bona fide write-in candidate is eligible for equal time as
he launches his campaign.
This would clearly be a denial of equal
protection under the law.
Section 315 of the Communications
Act of 1934, as amended states that if a licensee permits any person who is a
legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting
station, he must afford "equal opportunities" to all other such
candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station. If a
legally qualified candidate appears on a bona fide newscast, bona fide news
interview, bona fide documentary or on-the-spot coverage of a bona fide news
event such an appearance will not be deemed a use of a broadcasting station for
the purposes of Section 315.
Regarding the complaints of Linda
Jennes and Andrew Pulley against Metromedia, Inc., National Broadcasting
Company and Mutual Broadcasting System, you claim that despite the fact that
both are under the minimum age of 35 as set by the Constitution in order
to [*92] be eligible as President and Vice-President they should
for various reasons be considered to be legally qualified candidates. The
Commission has repeatedly stated that a legally qualified candidate must be
determined by reference to the law of the state in which the election is being
held. In general a candidate is legally qualified under Section 315 if he
can be voted for in the state or district in which the election is being held,
and, if elected, is eligible to serve in the office in question. See Use
of Broadcast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 35 Fed. Reg. 159,
Public Notice of August 7, 1970, Section IV, Question and Answer number
1. The Commission agrees that the Twentieth Amendment provides the
procedure to be followed in the event of the election of a president or vice
president who is not qualified to take office. However, neither the
legislative history which you cite nor the logical thrust of the Twentieth
Amendment give us reason to overturn our interpretation of who is a legally
qualified candidate for purposes of Section 315. It is clear from the
facts before us that Ms. Jennes and Mr. Pulley if elected, would not be
eligible to serve as President or Vice President because they do not meet the
minimum age requirement of 35 as set by the Constitution. Therefore they
cannot be considered legally qualified candidates for the offices of President
and Vice President and Metromedia, Inc., National Broadcasting Company and
Mutual Broadcasting System need not provide them with "equal
opportunities" to reply to Senator Eagleton and Senator McGovern.
The additional issues concerning Senator Eagleton's appearance and related to
these complaints are moot unless Ms. Jenness and Mr. Pulley are legally
qualified candidates, and it is unnecessary for the Commission to reach a
decision on these issues.
In connection with your complaint
regarding Fred Halstead, candidate for U.S. Senate from Illinois, you ask when
third-party candidates for state office become eligible for equal time.
The Commission does not differentiate between major party candidates and
candidates of other parties. Any candidate who complies with the law of
the state in which the election is being held is generally considered to be a
legally qualified candidate. In addition Section 73.657(a) of the
Commission's Rules defines a legally qualified candidate as:
... any person has publicly
announced that he is a candidate for nomination by a convention of a political
party or for nomination or election in a primary, special, or general election,
municipal, county, state or national, and who meets the qualifications
prescribed by the applicable laws to hold the office for which he is a
candidate, so that he may be voted for by the electorate directly or by means
of delegates or electors, and who:
(1) Has qualified for a place on the
ballot or
(2) Is eligible under the applicable
law to be voted for by stricker, by writing in his name on the ballot, or other
method, and (i) has been duly nominated by a political party which is commonly
known and regarded as such, or (ii) makes a substantial showing that he is a
bona fide candidate for nomination or office, as the case may be.
Section 73.657(f) also provides that
a "candidate requesting... equal opportunities of the licensee, or
complaining of noncompliance to the Commission shall have the burden of proving
that he and his opponent are legally qualified candidates for the same public
office."
It is clear in this case that Mr.
Halstead decided to get on the Illinois ballot via the petition method.
It appears from the facts before [*93] us that at the time of
Congressman Pucinski's appearance and even at the time of this complaint more
than three months later, Mr. Halstead's petitions still had not been certified
nor his name officially placed on the ballot in Illinois. n2 Therefore, there is no basis for stating that he is
a legally qualified candidate under the petition method until he is certified
as such by the Illinois Secretary of State. See Use of Broadcast of
Facilitated by Candidates for Public Office, supra. You state that Mr.
Halstead will seek to become a write-in candidate for Senator if he is unsuccessful
in his attempt to be placed on the ballot via the petition method.
However, it is clear that as of the time of Congressman Pucinski's appearance
on WTTW, and indeed for a considerable time thereafter, he had not attempted to
become a write-in candidate and could not be considered a legally qualified
candidate via the write-in method. At such time that Mr. Halstead chooses
to conduct a write-in campaign, the question as to whether he is a bona fide
write-in candidate and therefore legally qualified under the provisions of
Section 73.657(a) and (f) will then be decided if a Commission determination
becomes necessary at that time. (cf. Anthony L. Bruno, 26 FCC 2d
656 (1970). In any event, it appears that Mr. Halstead was not a legally
qualified candidate at the time of Representative Pucinski's appearance and
therefore was not entitled to equal opportunities in connection with his April
26 appearance.
n2 In a telephone conversation on
September 13, 1972 between you and a member of the Commission's staff you
stated that Mr. Halstead's only basis for claiming that he was a legally
qualified candidate to Station WTTW was that he was attempting to get on the
ballot in Illinois via the petition method. You also state that Mr.
Halstead is only conducting a petition drive and has not attempted to become a
write-in candidate and will not attempt to become a write-in candidate unless
he fails in his petition drive.
Commissioner
Johnson dissenting and issuing a statement.
BY DIRECTION
OF THE COMMISSION, BEN F. WAPLE, Secretary.
DISSENT:
DISSENTING OPINION OF COMMISSIONER
NICHOLAS JOHNSON
In its letter to Mr. Larry Seigle
(National Campaign Manager for the Socialist Workers Party), the Commission
majority plunges headlong into the decision of issues which would give our
greatest jurists considerable pause. The question of who is or is not a
"legally qualified candidate" for national office is far more complex
than is indicated by the majority's shallow analysis.
Linda Jenness and Andrew Pulley are
said to be the duly nominated candidate for President and Vice candidates for
President and Vice President of the Socialist Workers Party. As such,
they are entitled to opportunities for access to the airwaves equal to those of
their opponents, under Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934, unless
and until the Supreme Court has decided otherwise or until Congress has altered
the Section.
Vice Presidential candidate Andrew
Pulley requested equal time from Metromedia, Inc., following a July 27, 1972
appearance by then-Democratic Vice Presidential candidate Thomas Eagleton on
the Merv Griffin Show. Metromedia refused, using only the argument that
it believed that the withdrawal of Senator Eagleton made the request
moot. Candidate Linda Jenness requested equal time from NBC and the
Mutual Broadcasting System in order to reply to a speech made by
[*94] Democratic Party nominee George McGovern on August 5, 1972.
While Mutual denied the request on the basis that the appearance of Senator
McGovern was a news broadcast, NBC chose to deny the request because Ms.
Jenness was under 35 years of age. The Commission has decided these two
cases solely on its own interpretation of who is, or is not, a "legally qualified
candidate." If Ms. Jenness and Mr. Pulley are not "legally qualified
candidates," so the argument goes, none of the other issues need be
reached. The Commission's rules include in the definition of
"legally qualified candidate" the criteria that the candidate must
met "the qualifications prescribed by the applicable laws to hold the
office for which he is a candidate." The majority holds that both
candidates, because they are too young to hold the office for which they are
running are, therefore, not legal candidates for office.
The majority's mistake is in the
slipshod application of its own procedural rules and "guidelines" in
such a manner as to give them substantive validity. The majority states
that "Any candidate who complies with the law of the state in which the
election is being held is generally considered to be a legally qualified
candidate." [emphasis added] In addition, the majority purports to define
a "legally qualified candidate" within the context of its Rules.
I had always been under the
impression that the U.S. Constitution took precedence over the Rules of the
Federal Communications Commission. That Constitution gives the
requirements for holding the two highest offices in this country. See
Article 2, Section 1, Clause 4. It most certainly does not delineate the
requirements for candidates to those offices, and moreover provides, in
Amendment XX, Section 3, for the eventuality of the election of a President or
Vice President not eligible otherwise to serve:
If a President shall not have been
chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President
elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as
President until a President shall have qualified: and Congress may be law
provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President
elect shall have qualified...
[emphasis
added] I can find no other implication in the words of this Amemdment than that
the right of Ms. Jenness and Mr. Pulley to run for President and Vice President
and even to be elected to those offices is a constitutionally protected one,
regardless of the nature of their inability to serve.
In the case of 31-year-old Ms.
Jenness, I need only reiterate petitioner's point that one need look no further
than the Constitution to discover the procedure whereby she would be entitled
to inauguration as President the moment she reaches her 35th birthday.
Thus, the presumption made by the majority that "It is clear from the
facts before us that Ms. Jenness and Mr. Pulley, if elected, would not be
eligible to serve as President or Vice President..." does not, as it would
insist, so simplistically lead to the assumption that the Socialist Worker
Party candidates should be denied their legal rights as candidates.
The majority's action regarding
Socialist Worker Party, U.S. Senate candidate Fred Halstead is, if anything,
even less excusable than its resolution of the more complicated intellectual
issues confronting Jenness and Pulley. I can find no justification for
this denial even [*95] within the context of a proper application
of the Commission's Rules.
Mr. Halstead requested equal time
from station WTTW, Chicago, after an appearance on April 26, 1972 by Congressman
Roman C. Pucinski, the Democratic nominee for the U.S. Senate. The
licensee of WTTW demanded a letter from the Secretary of State of Illinois
declaring that Mr. Halstead was a "legally qualified candidate."
However, petitioner submits that the Secretary of State has no statutory
authority to rule on the bona fide character of a candidate, but only to
certify the candidate onto the state ballot once he has submitted a sufficient
number of nominating petitions. Moreover, Illinois law did not even allow
Mr. Halstead to file his petitions until well after the appearance by Mr.
Pucinski. The station, however, refused to grant Mr. Halstead the time,
and the Commission has now upheld that refusal with what is at best a tortured
misreading of its own Rules and definitions.
The Commission's Rules define a
"legally qualified candidate" as one who either "(1) Has
qualified for a place on the ballot or (2) Is eligible under the applicable law
to be voted upon by sticker, by writing in his name on the ballot, or other
method, and (i) has been duly nominated by a political party...." §
73.657(a). [emphasis added]
The fact that Mr. Halstead is
attempting to pursue the longer, more arduous process of getting his name on
the ballot in Illinois by nominating petitions by no means renders him
"ineligible" under Illinois law to be a write-in candidate. Yet
this Commission has placed itself in the absurd position of penalizing Mr.
Halstead, the "duly nominated" candidate of his party, for pursuing
the former, even though he has expressed every intent of falling back on the
status of "write-in" candidate should his petition drive fail.
This decision, in effect, serves to deprive all minority or fringe party
candidates of their not inconsiderable rights under Section 315 of the
Communications Act for attempting to use other, equally precious, rights
guaranteed them under our system of democracy.