I. INTRODUCTION *

II. PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF THE COLUMBIA/WILLAMETTE INC. V. AMERICAN COALITION OF LIFE ACTIVISTS *

V. APPLYING BRANDENBURG TO MEDIA INJURY SPEECH *

VI. CREATION OF A NEW MEDIA SPEECH INJURY EXCEPTION *

"VISUALIZE Abortionists on Trial" greeted readers beginning in January of 1997 at the Internet address of http://www.christiangallery.com/atrocity. This anti-abortion Web site known as the Nuremberg Files read like a wanted-poster listing the names and personal information of doctors who perform abortions as well as the names of judges, lawyers, and clinic workers who provide abortion services. The Nuremberg Files were seen as a threat to these doctors that they must stop performing abortions or else they would be killed.

The topic of this note is whether this Web site containing the "Nuremberg Files" is entitled to First Amendment protection as addressed in Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists. First, I will examine the free speech analysis used in media speech injury cases and apply it to the Nuremberg Files. Second, I will discuss a proposed modification of the intent and imminency prongs of the traditional Brandenburg incitement exception to free speech. Finally, I will address problems in applying media injury speech analysis to speech on the Internet.

Plaintiffs Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc., Portland Feminist Women’s Health Center and individual physicians brought an action against the anti-abortion organization called American Coalition of Life Activists (ACLA), Advocates for Life Ministries, and twelve individual anti-abortion activists for violating Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act ("FACE") Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") and the Oregon Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("ORICO"). An analysis of the RICO and ORICO claims is beyond the scope of this note. The issue in this case is whether defendant’s statements in posters and other documents constituted "true threats" that are not protected by First Amendment. The threats that are discussed in the case are The Deadly Dozen Poster, the Crist Poster, Bumper stickers and the Nuremberg Files.

The information that later became part of the Nuremberg Files was collected during an ACLA event in January 1996. At this event, people were encouraged to place identifying information of doctors, lawyers, judges and others into a box labeled the "Nuremberg Files." The information gathered was used to create dossiers on individual abortion providers. At the same event, a "White Rose Banquet" was held to honor individuals who were incarcerated for committing anti-abortion violence.

The "Nuremberg Files" appeared on the Internet in January 1997 at the Web address http://www.christiangallery.com/atrocity. At the top of the Web page it read "VISUALIZE Abortionists on Trial" followed by:

These files included personal information like photos, addresses and license-plate numbers. In some cases, the files contained the names of the physicians’ children and the schools they attended. In three areas, the Web page bears drawing of lines of blood dripping from fetus parts. Also perhaps most importantly, doctors who have been killed by pro-lifers were crossed off the wanted list. Those who were wounded were shaded in gray. Four doctors and two clinic workers killed by anti-abortion activists since 1993 are crossed off, including Dr. Barnett Slepian, who was killed by a sniper in his home on October 23, 1998.

It was determined in Planned Parenthood I that FACE does not violate the First Amendment because it is a content neutral statute that serves as important governmental interest in preventing violence and preserving access to reproductive health services and is narrowly tailored to further those interests. Thus, the district court applied an objective, speaker-based test to determine whether for purposes of FACE analysis whether these threats were "true threats."

The plaintiffs must prove that the defendants conduct violated or conspired to violate FACE, which describes "threats of force" that intentionally "intimidate" a person from providing reproductive health services. True threats are not protected speech under the First Amendment.

The district court held that only the Deadly Dozen poster, the Crist poster, and the Nuremberg Files were actionable and denied defendant’s summary judgment motion as to these materials. Then on February 2, 1999 a federal jury awarded Planned Parenthood and the other plaintiffs $107 million in damages which is one of the largest awards in Oregon history. Judge Jones on February 25, 1999 endorsed the jury’s verdict by stating "I find that each defendant acted with specific intent and malice in a blatant and illegal communication of true threats to kill, assault or do bodily harm to each of the plaintiffs and with the specific intent to interfere with or intimidate the plaintiffs from engaging in legal medical practices and procedures."

He then entered a permanent injunction ordering the ACLA not republish any of the "Nuremberg Files" Web site material or its equivalent. The broadly worded injunction prohibited defendants and anyone "acting in concert" with them from publishing the "Deadly Dozen" list and the Nuremberg Files. Judge Jones called the Web site and the posters "blatant and illegal communication of true threats to kill." He also said, "I totally reject the defendants’ attempts to justify their action as an expression of opinion or as a legitimate and lawful exercise of free speech in order to dissuade the plaintiffs from providing abortion services." Defying the injunction could result in criminal prosecution and fines up to $1000 a day. The 465 findings of fact are available in the permanent injunction order of March 13, 1999.

Planned Parenthood is an important case because it is the first case under FACE that does not involve direct personal confrontation or direct threats. Also, the broad language of the injunction raises important free speech issues that involve controlling the content of the Internet through regulation or through prior restraint. Legal scholars feel that the motion may violate the free-speech doctrine of prior restraint because the doctrine allows the government to punish people for illegal speech but not gag them before they say it. Also, a jurisdictional problem arises because this injunction regulates the activities of the Web site creator Neal Horsley, Jr. over which the court has no personal jurisdiction.

This appeal of this case by ACLA will be important to free speech analysis because, "[t]he standard which if finally adopted in this case will apply in many future cases and must be carefully drawn both to safeguard against any chilling effect on free speech while still preventing the First Amendment from being used as a shield by those who make true threats of violence."

Although the jury in this case applied the "true threat" First Amendment analysis to determine if FACE was violated, on appeal it may also be proper for a court to determine if the Nuremberg Files are entitled to First Amendment protection by employing an incitement analysis.

The Supreme Court has stated that speech is generally protected unless it falls into a limited number of exceptions. The categories of unprotected speech include obscenity, libel, fighting words, child pornography and inciting speech. Although the Supreme Court in Watts v. United States, stated in dicta that threats are not protected speech, it is not a well defined exception. The courts have seldom utilized a "true threat" analysis outside of FACE. It would then be appropriate to discuss whether the defendants’ posters and Web site were inciting imminent lawless action and could be limited by applying the inciting speech exception as defined in Brandenburg v. Ohio. An incitement analysis may also be used in future civil actions against disseminators of speech on the Internet.

In Brandenburg, the defendant, a leader of the Ku Klux Klan, was charged with violating Ohio’s Criminal Syndicalism Statute that forbade the advocacy of crime or violence as a means of accomplishing political reform. The Supreme Court held the statute was unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment. The Court developed a new test that is thought of as a combination of the Holmes and Hand tests that functions as an even greater protection of speech. The Court’s new test for proscribing speech that advocated the use of force or crime is broken down into four requirements. The four prongs include (1) the speaker must have ‘specifically intended’ the words to bring about a particular lawless or violent result (2) the words must be ‘directed to’ inciting or producing violent or lawless action (3) the lawlessness or violence contemplated must be likely to actually result from the speech and (4) the lawlessness or violence must be likely to occur in the ‘imminent’ future.

The Brandenburg test is "highly speech protective," and to limit speech under Brandenburg, all four prongs of the test must be met. Applying the Brandenburg test has become increasingly complex in current litigation.

For purposes of free speech analysis, it is useful to compare Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette Inc. v. ACLA to the mass media injury speech cases that we have seen in recent years such as Rice v. Paladin.

In Rice, representatives of victims brought a wrongful death action against Paladin Enterprises the publisher of Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors that assisted a murderer in soliciting, preparing for, and committing the murders on their family members. Hit Man gave numerous explicit instructions on how to become a contract killer through powerful prose in the second person and imperative voice. In Rice, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the First Amendment does not erect an absolute bar to the imposition of civil liability. The court remanded the case for trial.

In other media speech injury cases where individuals have sought to hold publishing or production companies liable for deaths of family members allegedly caused in part by the company’s book or movie, courts have applied the traditional Brandenburg incitement exception to free speech to find these companies not liable. Now, many are urging courts to apply a modified Brandenburg test to these cases in order to find this speech the creates a great risk of harm with allegedly little or no social value not protected by the First Amendment.

In the present case, although the defendants are not members of the mass media, the case can be analyzed along the same lines as the media speech injury cases. ACLA’s publication of the Nuremberg Files on the Internet, is speech that potentially reached a large audience which makes it similar to mass distribution mass media speech in books or movies. However, it is appropriate to note that the fact that this is a Web page may make it inherently different and therefore requires its own method of analysis.

Courts have been applying traditional Brandenburg analysis to media injury speech. However, they have been reluctant to find that most mass media speech constitutes "inciting speech" under this highly speech protective test. This is generally occurs for two reasons.

First, most mass media speech is disseminated randomly to an anonymous audience. This makes it difficult for those seeking to limit the speech to show that the speakers has a "specific intent" to incite their listeners/readers to commit particular lawless or violent actions.

Second, the listeners/readers may respond criminally or with violence to the speech long after the speech has been disseminated. Thus, it may be difficult to satisfy the imminence prong of the Brandenburg test if the courts continue to construe imminence to mean "immediate".

Legal scholars are advocating that a new free speech exception should be created to deal with these mass media speech issues because the traditional Brandenburg test was meant to apply only to a specific set of factual and procedural circumstances generally called "crowd arousal". It is argued that Brandenburg law predates society’s concerns about mass media speech and that it has become a challenge to apply Brandenburg to other speech mediums.

However, a number of courts continue to apply the "inciting speech" test of Brandenburg in civil suits against media defendants whose speech has allegedly occasioned physical harm to third parties.

Others argue that Brandenburg may still be applicable in mass publication speech contexts if the speaker intent and imminency prongs of the test were modified to better fit the factual and procedural characteristics of media speech injury civil cases.

In applying Brandenburg to most media speech injury cases it is likely that speech opponents can show that that speech met the "directed to" and "likelihood" prong of the Brandenburg test. Similarly, it is likely that the Planned Parenthood plaintiffs could show that defendants directed their speech to an audience that would act against the plaintiffs and that were likely to do so. Therefore, it is appropriate to focus on the two remaining prongs of the Brandenburg test: the intent requirement and the imminency requirement.

Legal scholars advocate a new categorical exception to the First Amendment for media speech injury cases. They think it should be applied to detailed instructional speech about criminal activity such as that published in Rice v. Paladin, or to speech involving "suicidal pornography" like in Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc..

Advocates argue that the standard used for this new categorical exception should be similar to the standard used in proscribing obscene speech. The Supreme Court has refused to protect obscene speech under the First Amendment because it lacks social value. Similarly, in the murder manual cases, it is argued that the speech has little or no political or social value and should not be protected.

Some scholars suggest that courts should adopt the standard set forth in Dennis v. United States to construe a new media speech injury exception. The Dennis test asks whether "the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." The test will allow for an easier application to media injury cases that do not fit in to the "crowd arousal" circumstances of Brandenburg. Speech with very low value and very high costs does not benefit the marketplace of ideas. However, opponents to a new categorical exception will argue that allowing a new test lacks any limiting principle. These opponents are wary of a slippery slope where judges can bar media speech that results in injury based on only subjective criteria.

However, it is unlikely that a court would choose to create a new exception to speech in a case such as Planned Parenthood using either the obscenity or Dennis standards. It would be difficult for the Planned Parenthood plaintiffs to show that the Nuremberg Files Web page contained no social or political value. Abortion is one of the most socially and politically debated topics in society today. Although the Web page may be offensive, it is expressing an anti-abortionist view. It is interesting to note the distinction between speech that advocates killing anyone to speech that advocates killing people that are members of a particular group. It is that latter that receives more protection under the First Amendment. Also, it would be difficult to show that the gravity of defendant’s evil is so great that it justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger. Although the potential for evil is great because the Web site was disseminated on the Internet, it is difficult to measure how many people would actually ever read the Nuremberg Files and then act against plaintiffs.

Instead, if a new categorical exception is made in regard to free speech it is likely to come from the Supreme Court in a case similar to the facts of Rice. The Court will create this exception where the facts are so unlike the crowd arousal of Brandenburg that a new approach is needed to limit speech that is used for conveying detailed information about how to commit serious crimes. The Supreme Court has chosen as of yet not to do so. Instead they have continued to apply the traditional Brandenburg test.

Generally, ‘media-speech’ injury cases have not fared well due to the "specific intent" requirement implied in Brandenburg. It is difficult for the speech opponents to prove that the media speakers "specifically intended" for their speech to inspire audience member to engage in lawlessness or violence. This is because the speech is disseminated to anonymous audience members and many purposes such as information or education rather than illegality or violence may have motivated the speech. Some commentators argue that "specific intent" is unwarranted when Brandenburg is applied in mass publication speech cases.

It is argued that Brandenburg’s speaker culpability requirement should be lowered from "specific intent" to mere "knowledge." This may be generated in part from the test set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, where in a civil libel action against a newspaper publisher, the Supreme Court held that the level of speaker culpability was something less than "specific intent." These commentators argue that since the Court in Sullivan, set the requisite level of media speaker intent at less than "specific intent" in a civil suit involving the tort of libel, there is no reason that it should not similarly hold with respect to the level of speaker culpability required in civil cases involving other torts by media speakers.

Instead, these commentators believe that a media speaker should be subject to civil liability for injuries caused by its speech if the occurrence of harm was foreseeable to the media speaker at the time it disseminated its speech to a mass audience.

It is worth noting that "media-speech injury" cases are civil actions, whereas most "crowd arousal" cases like Brandenburg involve criminal prosecutions. This is important because there is much greater justification for requiring "specific speaker intent" in criminal actions than in civil actions because personal liberty is at stake. In countering this argument, free speech advocates will claim that a much greater interest is at stake. They are concerned that lowering the required level of speaker culpability will have a "chilling" effect on media speech because of the concern of paying a great amount of monetary damages if they are held liable. In fact, this doesn’t seem to be a concern to the courts. Only a few courts have denied money damages in media speech injury cases because of their concern that allowing such recovery would foster a chilling of much legitimate media speech. Those in favor of modifying the Brandenburg test will argue that the intent element be shifted to coincide with the requisite intent needed in most civil actions. Brandenburg and the "clear and present danger" line of cases involved criminal prosecutions usually in an ideological context. The test adopted by the Court in Brandenburg was designed to apply to similar situations involving other criminal statutes and correspond to the mens rea required in these criminal statutes.

In the instant case, one could argue that defendants knew that there was a risk that readers could use the information to further their homicidal aims in threatening, harassing, or killing those providing reproductive services or those seeking to obtain reproductive services. However, it is important to note that no court has held that the level of speaker intent required by the Brandenburg should vary depending on the factual circumstances or the civil nature of the speech. Instead they continued to apply the traditional Brandenburg test. One court in Byers v. Edmondson has even explicitly refused to lower the intent requirement to mere "knowledge" in a case involving a media speaker sued in tort for injuries allegedly caused by its speech.

Alternatively, if courts continue to state that the "specific intent" requirement is the appropriate standard for determining speaker’s culpability one can argue that specific intent is demonstrated in defendants’ publication of the Nuremberg Files Web site. The specific intent requirement of Brandenburg may be to protect the speaker from unintended consequences of his speech. A speaker is not punished for mere advocacy. Instead, a speaker is punished for incitement to cause imminent lawless action. However, in some media cases like Rice, arguably there is only one result intended – the completion of a contract killing. Similarly here, it could be argued that the only intent of the Web page was the killing or causing serious bodily injury of abortion providers. The evidence of this is the crossing out of names in the Nuremberg files of those who were killed and shading in gray those who were injured. Also, the areas of blood on the page are an encouragement to act violently.

However it is likely that the defendants will rely on Noto v. United States, where it states that "[t]he purpose of the Brandenburg test was to distinguish between the mere abstract teaching . . . of moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action." ACLA will argue that the Web site is mere abstract advocacy of violence as a necessary means to further anti-abortion viewpoints and that is was not steeling its audience to such violent action against abortion providers.

If the court chooses to modify the Brandenburg intent element to be that of knowledge rather than "specific intent" it is likely that the speech used in ACLA’s Web site would satisfy this prong. However, if the court remains faithful to the traditional Brandenburg test it is unlikely that a court would find that the defendants specifically intended the speech to cause harm to plaintiffs.

Commentators argue that the traditional "imminence" requirement of Brandenburg is too limited in media injury speech cases and should adopt a modified test. They argue that once again the circumstances surrounding Brandenburg limited its application to "crowd arousal" cases. It is argued that the nature of the harm at issue in a given "media-speech injury" case should have considerable impact on a court’s determination of the operative "imminency" time frame. In cases like Brandenburg it is a relatively common occurrence that the action called for by the speaker would take place in the very near future. Here, it is inappropriate to think that there was an imminent threat only if readers acted violently upon plaintiffs within days or hours upon reading the Web site. In circumstances given here along with those in contract murder cases like Rice the court should look at the planning process along the way to committing a violent or illegal act.

Also it is argued that the Brandenburg Court never expressly determined the issue of what is meant by "imminent" lawless action. By following the "clear and present danger" line of cases, it seems that the definition of imminence used in Dennis v. United States, is still applicable. Thus, the Court should rely on the Dennis standard and ask as mentioned in section - "whether the gravity of the "evil", discounted by improbability, justifies such an invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." Here, plaintiffs will argue that the gravity of the evil may justify such an invasion. This type of speech has a lower social value combined with a real threat of harm to the public. Doctors were given FBI protection after the Web site began and were in fear for their lives.

The "clear and present danger" line of cases relied on the "marketplace of ideas" notion that if there is time for reasoned consideration the truth will come out. These cases held that suppression of speech is only acceptable when the danger is immediately present that there is no time for the truth to be sought. However, today there is no basis in believing that the truth will "defuse unlawful advocacy." In Brandenburg, the speeches were made in public with the opportunity for opposing views to be heard giving people the opportunity to form their own well informed opinion. Here, people read this type of speech in the privacy of their own homes on their personal computer leaving no opportunity for reasoned evaluation. Instead, there is only one viewpoint that threatening, injuring, or killing people to stop abortion serves a necessary purpose that is expressed. A person on the Internet has to actively seek the other information. For the "truth to be sought out" a person may have to look at multiple Web sites to see opinions on both sides of the issue. If the Court requires true immediate imminence, it is insensitive to society’s legitimate interest in self-protection. We do not live in the same society as in the days of Brandenburg. No longer are people’s concerns focused on speakers advocating an overthrow of the government. Instead, people worry about greater evil that effect their family such as kids taking homemade bombs to school or worrying if a neighbor is a contract killer. Plaintiffs will argue that society has a greater interest in self-protection than in protecting the harmful speech of ACLA. Defendants will argue that society has an interest in allowing this information to be told.

Plaintiffs will argue that violent action is imminent. The record states that when the posters and Web page were disseminated the FBI issued protection almost immediately to the plaintiff’s and clinics mentioned. The FBI told the individual physicians to wear bulletproof vests and then implemented other security measures at the clinics. "Throughout our decisions there has recurred a distinction between the statement of an ideal which may prompt its hearers to take unlawful action, and advocacy that action be taken." It is present advocacy and not intent to advocate in the future that is unprotected speech. Arguably, the content of the Web site is present advocacy. As mentioned above, the Web site contained personal information about physicians, politicians and lawyers. In three areas, the page bears drawing of lines of dripping blood dripping from fetus parts. On the Web site, doctors who have been killed by pro-lifers were crossed off the wanted list. Those who were wounded were shaded in gray.

In determining imminency, the Court may choose to view the events in time as a simultaneous interaction between the reader and author. The fact that time passes between a person reading the Web site and committing a violent crime against persons like the plaintiffs is irrelevant. In People v. Rubin, the Court held that a Nazi Party demonstration and march to be held in five weeks was imminent in terms of political assassination. The Court also stated, "time is a relative dimension and imminence a relative term, and the imminence of an event is related to its nature." Plaintiffs could argue that the nature of the crimes against abortion providers requires a rigorous planning process over time. Therefore, the Court should modify the imminence prong to comply with the circumstances in media injury cases and find that plaintiffs could satisfy the imminence prong.

Defendants are likely to argue that receiving information about people on the Web page was imminent but that violent actions against these people were not foreseen.

With the advent of the Internet, many areas of previously well-settled law are being questioned. Speech on the Internet invokes the use of a new medium that may make the application of the First Amendment a difficult task. Speech on the Internet may not be best analyzed by employing current free speech exceptions. Instead, a new mode of analysis may need to be applied to speech in this new medium.

Before a new Internet speech test can be adopted it is useful to compare the medium of the Internet to other mediums such as television or movies. Then when speaking of the Internet medium it is also important to determine on what kind of service the speech occurs. For example, e-mail, list serves, spam mail, bulletin board system, information web page or interactive web page are different activities available on the Web.

The task of doing a search on the Internet is a pull medium. A user has to "pull" the information out he/she wants. In comparison, television is a "push" medium. Television "pushes" the information at the person watching. It takes much less effort to turn the channel away from a program that is pushing information than pulling information from the "information super-highway." An argument can be made that regulating push medium in more important than regulating pull medium. In pull medium, there is less of chance that a person is going to be exposed to something they may find offensive. This is compared to accidentally flipping past some offensive material on cable television.

Although speech on the Internet can be compared to mass publication speech generally, there are a few difficulties. Perhaps the greatest obstacle is the freedom given to the Internet in ACLU v. Reno. In Reno, the Supreme Court held found the Communications Decency Act ("CDA")unconstitutional by construing the statute in light of legislative history and the Supreme Court analysis in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation. The Court found that the Internet more closely resembles books and newspapers than broadcast and cable television and is deserving of the utmost freedom from content regulation. This implies that strict scrutiny is applied when regulating content on the Internet. "In order to deny minors access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another." The Court concluded that the government did not pass strict scrutiny because it failed to show that there was no less restrictive alternative that would accomplish the same ends.

When the government tries to protect minors from non-obscene material, it must make great efforts to see that the rights of adults to access are not inadvertently hampered. Some time-place-manner regulation of the Internet will be acceptable. However, the government will have to use the least restrictive alternatives.

The Supreme Court’s holding giving the Internet the very broad First Amendment protection as given to books and newspapers and not the lesser protection given to over the air broadcast media implies that the any content-based limitation will be subject to the strictest of scrutiny. This is a very difficult test to pass. It is unlikely that the seeking to regulate speech such as that in the Nuremberg Files would pass strict scrutiny.

It is possible that dues to the anonymity and ease of the Internet, it further criminals in their activities. The relative ease and efficiency of the Internet allows for instantaneous communication that allows for would be criminals to communicate and conspire anonymously. Without the Internet these groups would have to plan a meeting to get together because information could not be sent back and forth through regular U.S. mail. Now would be criminals can conspire with a lessened fear of law enforcement.

Also for purposes of regulating obscenity or defamation, it may be difficult to find a community standard. The definition of community is difficult to define in terms of the Internet. Finding number 86 from ACLU v. Reno noted, "[o]nce a provider posts its content on the Internet, it cannot prevent that content from entering any community. Unlike the newspaper, broadcast station, or cable system, Internet technology necessarily gives a speaker a potential worldwide audience. Because the Internet is a network of networks (as described above in Findings 1-4), any network connected to the Internet has the capacity to send and receive information to any other network."

As mentioned above, courts will have to contend with defining imminency for purposes of Internet regulation. To determine imminency, the court may choose to employ a more traditional definition of imminency and look at the time when something is posted on the Internet to the time an unlawful act occurs. In the alternative, courts may develop a definition of imminency to look at from when someone actually reads the information on a web page, to the time the unlawful act occurs.

In addition, the Internet is accessible internationally. Many postings on the Internet originate outside the U.S. Can this speech be monitored and held liable under the Brandenburg incitement test. This creates personal jurisdiction problems.

The Internet has created many problems in legal analysis. Courts are going to be confronted with deciding whether to apply traditional forms of analysis or whether that the Internet is such a different creature that new tests will have to be adopted. The appeal of the Planned Parenthood verdict and injunction is likely to have an important impact on First Amendment analysis of the Internet. A concern of the appeals court may be regarding the injunction against maintaining the Web site. The government will have the burden of showing that the injunction satisfies strict scrutiny. In the alternative, the Court may allow the Web page to remain on the Internet but continue to allow the compensation to plaintiffs for substantial damages caused in their violations of FACE, ORICO and RICO. The court also faces a difficult task of defining speech exceptions for the Internet in future cases. It will be interesting to watch how cyberspace law is developed in the next few years.