The Emergence of the Internet
    First, it is important to gain a basic understanding of what the internet is and how it originated.  In short, the Internet is nothing more than a network of computer networks.13  It was created in 1969 as a Department of Defense experiment designed to maintain stable networked links between computers in the event of a nuclear attack.14 In order to achieve this objective, the Pentagon enlisted computer scientists to build a system that would allow an infinite number of computers to convey information without any single computer serving as a go-between.15 Due to the concern that a centralized computer system would be vulnerable to nuclear attack, a decentralized system was necessary.16
     Ultimately, the Department of Defense succeeded in establishing a computer system which could trade information from remote locations.17  Although the project started with a small number of locations, it was quickly recognized as a effective research and communications device.  Therefore, the utilization of the project came to include universities and corporations.18  As the project developed, it was refined and became known as the Internet.19
 Today, very few individuals are unaware of the computer generated phenomenon known as the internet20---the global communications network connecting a "virtual community" of tens of millions of users.21  In fact, it is difficult for one to browse through a newspaper, turn on the television, listen to the radio, or watch very many advertisements without coming across a web address or a other reference to this omnipresent computing sensation.  As the public's use and awareness of the internet continues to grow, the opportunities this medium presents appear to be both numerous and unlimited.22
     Although internet commerce really did not take off until about five years ago,23 its impact has already been phenomenal.  This electronic medium has radically and irreversibly altered the societal landscape by providing a relatively inexpensive way to obtain information and communicate with others.  In one way or another, the internet has affected--or will affect--all of our lives in ways both intricate and unforeseeable.24
 The internet's astounding growth has certainly caused a good deal of interest in the commercial community.  Once used primarily by hobbyists or members of the military or academia, the internet (or,  the "net" as it is commonly referred to) now belongs to everyone: the companies that sell goods and services, the individuals who can connect to the internet from their home, as well as organizations using the it as a conduit for their private communications.25  Businesses have come to understand how critical it is to communicate with the ever-changing marketplace which has become global in scale.  It appears as if companies are doing whatever they can to make sure they are not left behind.26  The following statistic illustrates why this is the case: the value of goods and services traded on-line is expected to reach $327 billion by the year 2000.27  Obviously, this is a considerable amount of consumer spending, and on-line purchasing is only expected to increase in the foreseeable future.
 Similarly, the legal community has attempted to keep pace with the internet's coming of age.  The United States Supreme Court announced in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,28 that "[t]he Internet is a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide communication."  To that end, some lawyers and law firms have already attempted to capitalize upon the Internet's growth and seemingly limitless potential.
 For instance, over the past three years, a growing number of lawyers have embraced this new tool by using e-mail and establishing Web sites to reach existing clients, potential clients, and various other legal professionals.29  While one might easily be able to see how a web site could attract potential clients, how could it benefit other legal professionals?  One possibility might be when an attorney from one state is seeking local counsel in another jurisdiction in some sort of multi-state litigation.  Another plausible context might occur when an attorney has links to articles he or she has written that someone else might find interesting or useful in their practice.  With all of the benefits the net provides, one would expect to see a rise in the number of attorneys/firms seeking a presence on the web.  Is this the case?
 According to the National Law Journal's 1997 Computer Survey, almost two-thirds of the largest U.S. law firms now have their own Web sites.30  In addition, from 1996 to 1997, the two-hundred and fifty largest law firms experienced a seventy percent increase in their presence on the World Wide Web.31  Although these figures only take the nation's largest law firms into account, it is hard to imagine why any attorney who supports lawyer advertising would not want a web presence.  Moreover, the relatively inexpensive cost makes this a realistic possibility.  Indeed, there seems to be a clear indication that the explosion of internet commerce has extended to the legal profession as well.32  Nevertheless, the rules regulating lawyer advertising have not kept pace with the significant portion of the legal profession that wants to utilize this unique form of communication.
 At this point, it may be important to mention that regulations pertaining to lawyer ethics are adopted and enforced on a state-by-state basis.33  Some states have used the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as their guide for establishing an ethical code, while others--including Iowa--have based them on the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.34  Notwithstanding the origin of each states' ethical regulations, the existing rules were crafted to address more traditional forms of advertising, such as print materials, newspaper advertisements, yellow pages, radio spots and even local television advertisements.35  Indeed, there is not an express statement in either the Model Code or the Model Rules that addresses internet advertising, and very few states have taken it upon themselves to speak to attorney advertising via this modern medium either.
 Still, the law of lawyer advertising is gradually changing as the courts and the profession review and rethink the current ethical standards in this area.  In the end, however, if the ethics committees do not consider changes or clarifications on their own, the internet's increasing presence, as well as lawyer demand for its use in disseminating information, will surely require the various state bar committees to consider how this new medium fits within the  framework of the laws they are duty bound to protect and uphold.  But in order to properly chart a course for the future of attorney advertising, the committee members will need to have a firm understanding of what the law used to be, where it currently stands, and how policy considerations helped shape the Supreme Court's decisions.

Attorney Advertising: A Historical Perspective
 In colonial America, it was often the case that quality goods and services were quite limited.  In addition, competition was sparse in many segments of the marketplace, so a seller needed only to convey information regarding availability of a product or service in order to attract buyers.36  Still, the lack of rivalry among sellers of goods and providers of services would not last for long. As competition increased, the simple disbursement of information regarding accessibility was no longer adequate to sell a product or service.  Distinguishing characteristics such as price and quality had to be shared to attract clientele.  This, in turn, created the need for persuasion.37
 By the end of the nineteenth century some advertisers were making inordinate claims about their products or services with relative impunity since no legal sanctions existed against such assertions.38  As misinformation in advertising increased, the need to develop legal means for dealing with the deception became readily apparent.39  As a result, government regulation of commercial advertising expanded in the twentieth century with states enacting statutes and implementing regulations which significantly restricted business advertising.40  While regulating commercial advertising clearly had First Amendment41 implications, states chose this course of action with the view that business advertising was simply another form of economic activity subject to governmental regulation.42
 In fact, until the mid-1970's the majority of courts upheld such limitations on advertising under the theory that "purely commercial advertising" was unprotected by the First Amendment.43  For example, in Valentine v. Chrestensen,44 the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a complete ban on the distribution of handbill advertisements that did not contain any form of political speech.  The Court held that "the First Amendment imposes no restraint of government as respects purely commercial advertising."45
 The legal profession would not escape increased regulation in the area of advertising.  In 1908, the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted a formal ban on lawyer advertising and solicitation in the original Canons of Ethics.46  While some researchers and commentators have presumed that the ban on advertising was one of several methods used by the organized bar in the early part of the twentieth century to limit entry into the profession and restrict trade, the American limitation on solicitation and advertising was, in part, an attempt to prevent certain social evils.47  For example, there was considerable concern regarding the consequences of overreaching (i.e., face to face solicitation).48  Furthermore, the 1908 ban was also justified on the ground that solicitation and advertising were simply unnecessary.
 Even though industrialization resulted in the expansion of urban centers, at the beginning of the twentieth century a majority of attorneys were still general practitioners in smaller communities, where legal services were provided in a one-on-one relationship between people who knew each other in the community.49  As the century progressed, however, communities grew in size, lawyers became more specialized, law and regulations touched a larger part of the public's daily activities, and the public's need for information about attorneys increased.
 Nevertheless, the limitations on advertising remained.  Even today, the freedom of speech is not viewed as an absolute right,50 although it is recognized as being "in a preferred position".51  In spite of that, since it is not an absolute right and therefore subject to judicial balancing, certain circumstances exist in which free expression must yield to other interests important to society.52  Yet in those circumstances where the state identifies a valid governmental interest and regulation is justified, the means employed can not "broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.  The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose."53  Therefore, in pursuing a valid governmental interest, the state must use regulatory mechanisms that are "the least restrictive" of free speech.54
     A great deal of attention has been devoted to what specifically constitutes "commercial speech".55  While theories differ as to its precise definition, commercial speech is generally thought of as "speech of any form that advertises a product or service for profit or for business purpose."56  Advertising that falls within this definition of commercial speech has historically been subjected to substantial regulation.57  As previously mentioned, until the mid-1970's the majority of courts upheld limitations on advertising in the business arena under the theory that "purely commercial advertising" was unprotected by the First Amendment.58
     The commercial speech doctrine was given its broadest interpretation in the 1971 case of Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell.59  In Capital Broadcasting, the United States Supreme Court affirmed a three-judge district court decision that upheld a ban on the advertising of cigarettes on electronic communication mediums regulated by the FCC.60  In examining the advertising ban the district court stated that "[i]t is established that product advertising is less vigorously protected than other forms of speech," further commenting that "Congress has the power to prohibit the advertising of cigarettes in any media."61  The district court dismissed the argument that the First Amendment protects the circulation of information concerning lawfully sold products, and therefore upheld the ban on the advertising of cigarettes.  In a troubled dissent, it was stated that the "theory of free speech is grounded on the belief that people will make the right choice if presented with all the points of view on a controversial issue."62  The dissent also noted that "the First Amendment does not protect only speech that is healthy and harmless," since the majority urged a content analysis test.63  This situation has led some legal scholars to ask the following question: What was to stop Congress from prohibiting the truthful advertising of anything it found to be harmful?64
     In trying to determine whether speech was commercial, courts attempted to determine if the speech was "purely commercial" advertising that merely proposed some sort of business transaction, or whether it also asserted an editorial position on matters of social or political concern.65  The fundamental difficulty with this analysis, however, was the fact that the First Amendment makes no explicit differentiation between commercial and noncommercial speech.66  If one assumes that an intrinsic part of every communication is some expression of ideas or values, drawing apparent  distinctions to characterize speech is a troublesome proposition.  In the mid-1970's, the Supreme Court considered a number of commercial speech cases which basically resulted in First Amendment protection for commercial speech and resolved the difficult issues the dissent alluded to in Capital Broadcasting v. Mitchell.67
     In 1976 the United States Supreme Court decided Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.68, which was the first of numerous decisions to pronounce that commercial speech is entitled to partial First Amendment protection due to its informational value to individual consumers and the public at large.69  Speaking to the issue of commercial speech and the regulation of professionals, the Court in Virginia Pharmacy invalidated a state statute that forbid licensed pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription drugs.70  The idea to be communicated was "I want to sell you X drug at Y price."  Clearly, this involved "pure" commercial speech.
 In applying a balancing test, the Court noted that pharmacists had a legitimate economic interest in the unregulated advertising of prescription drugs and that consumers had a strong interest in the uninhibited flow of commercial information.71  With regard to this commercial information, the Court concentrated on the relationship between commercial and political speech and noted that the particular consumer's interest in such commercial information "may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate."72  Still, in concluding that commercial speech was entitled to some protection, the Court did not hold that it could never be regulated under any circumstances.  Tipping its hand for how it might decide future cases, the Supreme Court also noted that "the special problems of electronic broadcast media are not in this case."
     On the other hand, the state contended (obviously unsuccessfully) that its desire to maintain "a high degree of professionalism" among pharmacists would indirectly result in the protection of the consumer's health.73  The Court rejected this argument, finding that an advertising ban did not guarantee professionalism.  In reality, the ban only served to keep the state of Virginia's consuming public in the dark on certain costs.74  As a result, the public's First Amendment interest in the free flow of honest and forthright information about a lawful commercial activity outweighed the state's asserted interest in maintaining professionalism among licensed pharmacists.75  The Supreme Court held that a state may not place a comprehensive ban on the "dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information's effect upon its disseminators and its recipients."76
     Thus, the Court realized that political and commercial speech both played important roles in providing the public with necessary and useful information.77  While political speech lies at the heart of the First Amendment's protection, the First Amendment protection afforded commercial speech grew from the realization that the ultimate value gleaned from political speech is also found in commercial speech.78  Still, the Court failed to afford commercial speech the same level of protection given political speech, despite the lack of meaningful distinction between the two.79  Therefore, while commercial speech is afforded refuge under the First Amendment, it still does not benefit from the full First Amendment protection of political speech.
 Even after Virginia Pharmacy, there was still some doubt about whether this new doctrine would apply to commercial communications by lawyers.  The Court conscientiously confined its decision to the facts of the case before it, specifically stating that its holding regarding the advertising of products sold by pharmacists might not apply equally to the regulation of advertisements of legal services by attorneys.80  The Court distinguished the advertising of doctors and lawyers from pharmacists in that the former provide a variety of services which have the "enhanced possibility for confusion and deception" should advertising be attempted.81  The theory was that pharmacists peddled a more standardized product.  As a result of the Court's dicta in Virginia Pharmacy, there was considerable uncertainty about whether the Court would extend equivalent protection to advertising by attorneys.82
     This hesitancy did not last for long.  The United States Supreme Court unshackled commercial speech by attorneys in the landmark case of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.83  In this case the Court considered whether the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech announced in Virginia Pharmacy applied to the regulation of advertising by attorneys.  In Bates, two lawyers formed a legal clinic with the intention of offering their services at a modest fee.  By concentrating on routine matters such as uncontested divorces, adoptions, and simple personal bankruptcies, they hoped to achieve some measure of success.84  Soon after opening, the two attorneys felt that the need for an expanded and regular flow of business required an improved ability to communicate with potential clients.
 In a 5-4 decision, the Bates Court claimed that state bans on lawyer advertising were unconstitutional infringements on the First Amendment commercial free speech rights of lawyers to communicate their services and the rights of individuals to gain that information.  More specifically, the Court held that states could not ban lawyers from advertising the price of "routine" legal services.85 While at first glance this holding may seem like a logical extension of Virginia Pharmacy, a dissent of four recognized the difference between regulating advertising of tangible products and professional services.  Nonetheless, the genie was out of the bottle.  What follows are some of the critical "attorney advertising" cases that followed the controversial decision in Bates.
 In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,86 the Supreme Court established a rather bright line rule which permits States to prohibit personal contacts completely, in part based upon the difficulty of regulating the content of the discussions.  The Court held that face-to-face solicitation could be banned because it was likely to involve fraud, intimidation or overreaching and was not subject to scrutiny by the Bar or the public.87
 In 1980, the Supreme Court handed down a decision that helped make clear the degree to which commercial speech would be afforded constitutional protection.  In Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission,88 a case that did not involve attorney advertising, a utility company contested an order of the New York Public Service Commission that prohibited any promotional advertising that might tend to inspire the use of electricity.89  Arguing to uphold the order, the Commission claimed that the State had an interest in energy conservation and the preservation of fair utility rates that legitimized the ban on advertising.90
   The Central Hudson Court undertook a fact-specific evaluation of the Commission's repressive order, and thereafter formulated a four-part test to be employed in cases involving commercial speech restrictions.  First, the speech under consideration must not involve unlawful activity nor be misleading.91  Second, the limitation on commercial speech must serve a "substantial" governmental interest.  Third, the rule or statute must directly advance the stated governmental interest.  Finally, the regulation must be "no more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest."92  The fourth element of the Central Hudson test came to be known as the "least restrictive" means analysis, whereby a state would be required to show that any hindrance upon commercial speech was by the least restrictive means available to protect the governmental interest.  Absent such a showing, the restriction would not pass constitutional examination.93
     Ultimately, the Central Hudson Court held that the Commission's prohibition violated the First Amendment because it failed to show that a more limited regulation on speech would not protect the state's interest.  Therefore, the rule failed under the fourth prong because all advertising was restricted without any showing that a less burdensome restriction would not adequately further the interest of energy conservation.94  The principle of "least restrictive means," as presented in Central Hudson, was followed until 1989, when the Supreme Court redefined its position for analyzing limitations placed on commercial speech.95  Still, in the lawyer commercial speech cases reviewed by the Court in the 1980's, the "least restrictive means" framework played a prominent role.96
     The line of analysis announced a few years earlier in Ohralik was reinforced in the case of In re R.M.J.,97 when the Supreme Court allowed direct mail advertising because it, like advertising in the public media, could be supervised and scrutinized by the Bar.  This case also gave the Court an opportunity to utilize the four-part Central Hudson test in an attorney advertising context.98  In addition to publishing a prohibited advertisement, the lawyer in R.M.J. mailed a letter announcing the opening of his new office to individuals with whom he had no personal or professional ties.  This practice was not permitted by Missouri's disciplinary rules.  Even though the attorney sent a letter to people who did not fall within the rules' specifically delineated categories, there was no indication of unseemliness surrounding the actual substance of the announcement cards that were mailed.99
     Considering the matter before it, the Court was unable to find the attorney's speech to be "inherently misleading, or that restrictions short of an absolute prohibition would not have sufficed to cure any possible deception."100  Furthermore, the Court stated that while "[m]ailings and handbills may be more difficult to supervise than newspapers...[t]here is no indication that an inability to supervise is the reason the State restricts the potential audience of announcement cards.  Nor is it clear that an absolute prohibition is the only solution."101  The Court suggested that the State could exercise reasonable supervision over mailings by requiring a copy of all general mailings to be filed with the Advisory Committee.102  Therefore, the Court held that the state's strict regulation of language used in advertising and its absolute prohibition against mailing announcement cards to individuals outside of specifically delineated classifications violated the protections afforded by the First Amendment.103
     In the 1985 case of Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio,104 the Court again addressed the regulation of commercial speech by attorneys, striking down a ban against truthful and nondeceptive print advertisements aimed at persons with specific legal problems and containing legal advice.105
     The Zauderer Court favorably cited Bates and R.M.J., claiming that since the state did not provide any justification for the content-based limitations on the attorney's speech, the regulations would not withstand First Amendment scrutiny.106  Again, the four-prong test announced in Central Hudson was applied to determine whether the lawyer's commercial speech was worthy of constitutional protection.107  In its analysis, the Court determined that two prohibitions were clearly impermissible: 1) prohibitions on solicitation of legal business through advertisements containing advice and information concerning specific legal problems, and 2) prohibitions against the use of illustrations in advertising.108  Again, the state had failed to meet its burden by failing to demonstrate that the prohibition on advertising directly advanced substantial state interests by the least restrictive means available.109
     In essence, the Supreme Court held that an attorney may not be disciplined for the solicitation of legal business through print advertising that contains truthful, nondeceptive information and advice about the legal rights of potential clients.110  Moreover, the Court's opinion indicated that advertising that renders information about legal rights to individuals who might otherwise be shut off from effective access to the legal system is more valuable than many other forms of advertising.111
     Zauderer and R.M.J., read in conjunction, made it clear that the telling distinction was between those advertisements and solicitations that are subject to Bar supervision and are conducive to reflection and an exercise of choice on the part of the client, and those that do not.
 The 1988 case of Shapero v. Kentucky State Bar Association112 affirmed this summary of prior cases.  In that case, a member of the Kentucky Bar applied to that state's Attorney Adverting Commission for approval of a letter that he proposed to send to potential clients known to face specific legal problems.113  Although the Commission did not find the letter to be false or misleading, it declined to approve it on the ground that a then-existing Kentucky Supreme Court Rule prohibited the mailing or delivery of written advertisements "precipitated by a specific event...involving or relating to the addressee...as distinct from the general public."114  Obviously, the concern is that such solicitation subjects the prospective client to pressure from trained professional in a direct and personal way.  When the potential client may be feeling overwhelmed by the situation which caused the need for the specific legal services, he or she may have seriously impaired capacity for good judgment and sound reasoning.  When an individual is in such a condition, the possibility of undue influence, overreaching and intimidation is readily apparent.
     Still, Justice Brennan, writing the majority opinion for the Shapero Court, stated that "a particular potential client will feel equally 'overwhelmed' by his legal troubles and will have the same 'impaired capacity for good judgment' regardless of whether a lawyer mails him an untargeted letter or exposes him to a newspaper advertisement---concededly constitutionally protected activities---or instead mails a targeted letter."115  The Court continued, stating that "[t]he relevant inquiry is not whether there exist potential clients whose "condition" makes them susceptible to undue influence, but whether the mode of communication poses a serious danger that lawyers will exploit any such susceptibility" [emphasis added].116  The Shapero Court made clear that "[i]n assessing the potential for overreaching and undue influence, the mode of communication makes all the difference."117
 So, while many individuals consider lawyer advertising an issue limited to the last twenty-five years, advertising actually was not prohibited until the American Bar Association's original Canons of Ethics denounced the practice in 1908.118  Thereafter, most state supreme courts disallowed lawyer advertising.119  Nonetheless, nearly seventy years later two U.S. Supreme Court cases quickly eroded this long standing limitation.  In Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc.,120 the United States Supreme Court for the first time extended First Amendment protection to commercial free speech.121  The following year the U.S. Supreme Court held, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,122 that state bans on lawyer advertising were unconstitutional infringements on the First Amendment commercial free speech rights of lawyers to communicate their services and the rights of individuals to gain that information.123  Since Bates, an unresolved debate that focuses on the appropriate role of commercialism within the legal profession, as well as the proper regulation of commercial activities, has continued.124
     When the U.S. Supreme Court refused states the right to prohibit attorneys from advertising, the Court simultaneously created an obligation on the bar to regulate advertising in ways that assure information flows freely and cleanly.125  The Court has established a four-part test to direct the constitutional permissibility of lawyer advertising regulations: 1) the state may prohibit speech that is false or misleading; 2) if the communications are truthful and non-deceptive, the state may limit them if the state asserts a substantial governmental interest; and 3) the regulation under scrutiny directly advances that state interest; and 4) the regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.126

Iowa's Response
 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Bates, the state of Iowa's canons of ethics--similar to the canons of most jurisdictions at the time--strictly prohibited any form of attorney advertising.  Interestingly enough, the prohibition was never question for the most part.127  Obviously, this rule could not continue after the holding in Bates.  What was the response?  While review of the law and regulations of all fifty states is beyond the scope of this note, it may be insightful to examine how a particular jurisdiction has chosen to react.  With that said, the question is raised: how has Iowa responded in the wake of Bates and its progeny?
 To a large degree, the state has adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.  This framework speaks to various facets of legal ethics, including lawyer advertising and marketing practices.  Nonetheless, the provisions adopted by the Iowa Supreme Court in the area of advertising are far more restrictive than those expounded in the Model Code.  In fact, it is commonly understood among members of the legal profession that Iowa has the most restrictive laws in the country when it comes to attorneys who wish to advertise.
 What are these prohibitions?  Disciplinary Rule 2-101(A) of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers states that:
"A lawyer shall not, on the lawyer's own behalf, or that of a partner, associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer's firm, use, or participate in the use of, any form of public communication which contains any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory, or unfair statement, which contains any statement or claim relating to the quality of the lawyer's legal services, which appeals to emotions, prejudices, likes, or dislikes of a person, or which contains any claim that is not verifiable."  Moreover, "[a]ll such communications shall contain the following disclosure: 'The determination of the need for legal services and the choice of a lawyer are extremely important decisions and should not be based solely upon advertisements or self-proclaimed expertise."
 In addition, Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B)(1) provides that "[l]awyer advertising may be communicated to the public in newspapers, periodicals, trade journals...and other similar advertising media, published and disseminated in the geographic area in which the lawyer maintains offices or in which a significant part of the lawyer's clientele resides, PROVIDED THAT the publisher agrees in writing to print all the disclaimers required by these rules in type size not smaller than 9-point on each page bearing the ad."  Additionally, the rule lists nineteen items thought to be useful to the public, such as your name, address, phone number, field of practice and so on.128
 While it is true that the state of Iowa also permits the use of electronic media for the dissemination of attorney information, the limitations are incredibly restrictive.  Iowa Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B)(5) states that "[i]nformation permitted by these rules, articulated only by a single nondramatic voice, not that of the lawyer, and with no other background sound, may be communicated by radio or television, or other electronic or telephonic media.  In the case of television, no visual display shall be allowed except that allowed in print as articulated by the announcer.  All such communications, to the extent possible, shall be made only in the geographic area in which the lawyer maintains offices or in which a significant part of the lawyer's clientele resides...."  Clearly, this sort of rules eliminates the use of the television as a medium for all practical purposes.  A simple cost/benefit analysis would surely indicate that it would not be worthwhile for an attorney to pay for a thirty second television spot with these limitations.
 Moreover, it is important to recognize that this rule--by definition--includes the powerful potential of the internet.  Therefore, under the current state of Iowa law, attorneys subject to Iowa's disciplinary rules are extremely limited in the type of advertisements they can publish on the internet.  Essentially, they are confined to what is permitted on the printed page.  Is this the proper course for the state of Iowa?  Do the public policy considerations asserted by the Iowa Supreme Court to justify the conditions placed on television advertising carry over to the medium of the internet?  The case of Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Association v. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1984), is a critical case in the area of attorney advertising and helpful in answering the questions just raised.
 In Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Association v. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1984) [hereinafter Humphrey I], an action was brought by the Bar Association committee to enjoin two lawyers in the same firm from advertising on television.  The facts of the case are fairly straightforward.  In September of 1982, two Des Moines attorneys aired advertisements over a Des Moines television station for a three day period.  They did so without seeking prior approval, since it was their belief that the rule exceeded the standards outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court.  There was no assertion that the three different ads aired over that three day period were inherently misleading.  Nonetheless, they all violated the Iowa Supreme Court's rule on lawyer advertising which expressly prohibited television advertisements which contained background sound, visual displays, more than a single, nondramatic voice or self-laudatory statements.  The television station discontinued the advertisements following a request from the ethics committee.  That same committee then instituted an action to enjoin the defendants from using the ads because they clearly violated the Court's professional canons.
 The majority opinion of the Iowa Supreme Court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court--while not specifically addressing the use of sound, visual displays, and dramatization--has clearly recognized the electronic use of those devices as potentially misleading.129  Footnote 3 of the Court's opinion cites the Capital Broadcasting Company case.  It states, in pertinent part, that "[t]he fact is that there are significant differences between the electronic media and print.  As the court noted in Branzhaf [citations omitted], written messages are not communicated unless they are read, and reading requires an affirmative act.  Broadcast messages, in contrast, are 'in the air'.  In an age of omnipresent radio, there scarcely breathes a citizen who does not know some part of a...jingle by heart.  It is difficult to calculate the subliminal impact of this pervasive propaganda, which may be heard even if not listened to, but it may reasonably be thought greater than the impact of the written word".130
 Indeed, the Unites States Supreme Court has described the broadcast media as uniquely pervasive or intrusive in several cases.  For instance, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978), the Court stated that "the broadcast media has established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans."  Further, in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 127 (1973), the court claimed that "viewers constitute a captive audience."  The Iowa Supreme Court used these citations, among others, to formulate its decision in Humphrey I.  In the end, the Court found that the state had a substantial governmental interest in regulating what the Court perceived as a medium ripe for potential abuse and the means employed were the least restrictive to accomplish the stated objective.
 Unhappy with the outcome, Mr. Humphrey appealed his case to the United States Supreme Court.  Without opinion, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to Iowa to be decided consistently with the Zauderer decision, which was decided at approximately the same time.  In Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Association v. Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d 643 (Iowa 1985) [hereinafter Humphrey II], the Iowa Supreme Court reiterated that "special problems do exist in the field of electronic advertising.  It was because of them that we...went to considerable effort to consider and draft our electronic advertising rule."131  On the basis of the record, the Court stated that "the situation in electronic advertising lies closer to face-to-face solicitation (which...can be proscribed) than to printed advertising (which cannot)".132
 In Humphrey II, the court claimed that "[e]lectronic media advertising, when contrasted with printed advertising, tolerates much less deliberation by those at whom it is aimed.  Both sight and sound areimmediate and can be elusive because, for the listener or viewer at least, in a flash they are gone without a trace.  Lost is the opportunity accorded to the reader of printed advertisements to pause, to restudy, and to thoughtfully consider."133
 In addition, the court expressed concern about the difficulties in policing advertisements via electronic communication.  In footnote 2, the court wrote that because of their elusiveness, "electronic advertisements are more difficult to police.  A printed advertisement is much easier to document, to trace, and to preserve than an electronic advertisement."134

Attorney Internet Advertising
 As convincing as the previously mentioned arguments may or may not be in the context of attorney advertising on television, one must question if the framework the state of Iowa has constructed for all "electronic" advertising is sufficient.  Indeed, many internet sites are 'multi-media' in the truest sense of the word.  The site content may consist of text, animation, pictures, sound and video."135  Moreover, "the internet provides users with the visual advantages of television and the interactive benefits of a telephone system.  It is this perfect blend of sight, substance, and access which makes the Internet so appealing to its users and the private sector."136  But, should attorney advertising on the internet receive the same treatment as marketing on television?  Is it deserving of its own rule?  Again, what animal are we trying to tame?  Would advertising on the internet be more like television advertising?  Or would it be more like print media?  In order to answer these questions, we need to take a look at the justifications for a distinction.
 In Humphrey I, the Iowa Supreme Court agreed with the U.S. Supreme Court that the electronic use of sound, visual displays and dramatization has the potential to be misleading.  But why is this the case?  What it is about these electronic tools that can lead to deception?  A few ideas are rolled into one here.  The Iowa Supreme Court believes that sound, visual displays and dramatization are potentially misleading because they both pervasive and intrusive.  In the context of television or radio this is certainly the case.  Once you choose to turn on your television or radio you are at the whim of the programming director to a certain degree.  Assume that you are watching your favorite "Leave it to Beaver" episode when programming is suspended for a station break.  Bang!  There is the ad right in front of you.  It forces itself on you.  Obviously, a listener has the option of leaving the room, turning her television off or selecting a differnet station, but at least initially, there is no control.  The message is already "in the air".  This being the case, the Iowa Court was concerned with how these messages can affected us subliminally.  Even if the communication is not listened to, it can still be heard.  Although it is difficult to quantify how much this actually affects the decisions society makes, it could certainly be an area of concern.
 Printed advertisements, on the other hand, do not convey a message unless the ad is read by the potential customer.  This requires an affirmative act on the part of the recipient.  You simply do not have the same fear about a captive audience that you do with television and radio spots.
 How does the internet fit into this distinction?  Undoubtedly, it has to fall on the side of being more like the printed medium.  At this point in the evolution of the internet, it is extremely rare to find yourself in an area where you did not intend to be.  Sure, there are those examples of where a woman is searching for information on breast cancer and finds herself staring at the latest Playboy Playmate.  Nonetheless, these instances are far more the exception than the rule.  Even banners--which are the equivalent of an internet billboard--require the user to "point and click".  Clearly, this is an affirmative act.
 Furthermore, the internet is premised on the concept of the search engine.  The user simply plugs in a topic of interest and a list of "hits" appears.  In order to view these areas, another affirmative act (the point and click) is required.  Therefore, an internet user finding himself among lawyer advertisements almost certainly reached that point on purpose.
 In addition, there is not the same concern about how communications from lawyers might affect the user subliminally.  Again, most individuals at a certain site want to be there.  Also, any sound applications usually require another affirmative act.  Finally, even if this wasn't the case, it is rare that people would have the internet on in the background.
 A second reason that the Iowa Supreme Court distinguished print advertisements and those on television was because of the inability to deliberate.  Indeed, this is a good argument when discussing televsion, but it does not hold up when applying the principle to the internet.  To be sure, television and radio ads are elusive.  Most spots are approximately thirty seconds, and if you missed a line or an important fact, you are unable to go back and listen again.
 Needless to say, this is not true of the internet.  Sight and sound are no longer elusive.  Unlike other electronic mediums, the recipient of the information is free to pause, restudy and thoughtfully consider what had just been seen or heard.  Moreover, the user is able to do this as many times as she prefers.  The ability to reflect and deliberate is simply not a problem with this vehicle of communication.
 For this reason, the Supreme Court's concern about policing is not as strong either.  Since the sight and sound is not elusive, there is ample opportunity to supervise the content of the ads being published on the web.  Further, it would be possible for attorneys to show the committee the site prior to its being posted.  If there were any problems, these could be addressed prior to publishing.
 Finally, some might argue that sounds and images have the power to manipulate the viewers mind and will.  While this argument might best be left for the psychologists, it is clearly a stronger argument when the means of electronic communication is the television.  Granted, in a thirty second spot--when there is mush less time for deliberation--bells and whistles have the potential of diverting attention from the "meat" of the message.  But in the context of the internet, this contention is much less persuasive.  The effect may be the same on the first go around, but as the ad is continually reflected upon and revisited, the concerns are likely to vanish.  Admittedly, some individuals may be struck by the impressive nature of a web sites layout, but is this really all that different than how things exist today.  The same people that are going to be impressed with a "cool" attorney website (if that is not an oxy-moron), are going to be impressed by dark, oak walls and leather sofas.

Conclusion
 In short, while strong arguments can be made for the principles the Iowa Supreme Court uses to support its decision in the area of television advertising, they simply do not hold up upon closer analysis in the context of attorney internet advertising.  As the committees on professional ethics consider arguments such as these in the future as they consider amendments or revisions to their respective codes of ethics, they should consider some of the rationales offered by the United States Supreme Court.
 Recall, Zauderer and In Re R.M.J., read in conjunction made it clear that the telling distinction in attorney advertising regulation wasa between those advertisements and solicitations that are subject to bar supervision and are conducive to reflection and an exercise of choice on the part of the client, and those that do not.  Further, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Shapero, stated that the important inquiry is whether the mode of communication poses a serious danger ripe for exploitation by attorneys.  "In assessing the potential for overreaching and undue influence, the mode of communication makes all the difference.  Indeed, if the goal of regulating attorney advertising is to promote rationale, intelligent and informed decision making, the internet clearly is deserving of special consideration and its own rule of regulation.  

*    John M. Perkins is expecting to graduate in May of 1999 from the University of Iowa College of Law.

1    Michael Covington, Ethics and the Internet, Electronics Now, Sept. 1, 1997 (quoting Will Rogers).

2         Richard N. Stichler, Ethics in the Information Market, in Ethics, Information and Technology Readings 169 (Richard N. Stichler & Robert Hauptman eds., 1998).
 
3    Id.
 

4    The nearly instantaneous exchange of information is the pitch for this new electronic world, with a mantra of faster, cheaper, better.  Similarly, computer manufacturers, stereomakers and software firms like Microsoft have attempted to steer this course for decades.  "Information at your fingertips" is what Bill Gates called it as far back as 1990 when it was just an enticing vision.  Now, it has become a lucrative reality.  See Michael Krantz, Click Till You Drop, Time, July 20, 1998, at 34.

5    Id. at 170; Gale Moore, Reassessing the Social Impacts of New Technology, Canadian Library Journal, Dec. 1987, at 421.

6    Stichler at 170.  See generally, Alvin Toffler, Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence at the Edge of the 21st Century (1990).

7    Stichler at 170.
 

8    The Florida Bar: Public & Media Information, Attorney Advertising,  1 (July 1997) <http://www.flabar.org/flabar/ information/Background/bip4.html>.

9    ABA Commision on Advertising, Lawyer Advertising at a Crossroads 29 (ABA Press, 1995).

10    Id.
 

11     This comment is based upon the author's discussions with several attorneys through out the Midwest portion of the United States.

12    See Supra Note 8; "[I]t is clear that advertising is a mojor factor in the delivery of legal services, especially to the poor.  While 70 to 80 percent of those who have used a lawyer found the lawyer through some form of personal referral, an increasing number of people find their lawyers through impersonal methods such as lawyer referral services, prepaid services and group legal plans and advertising."  American Bar Association Commission on Advertising, Lawyer Advertising at the Crossroads 3-4 (1995).

13  Adam R. Kegley, Note, Regulation of the Internet: The Application of Established Constitutional Law to Dangerous Electronic Communication, 85 Ky. L.J. 997, 1000 (1997)(citing John S. Zanghi, "Community Standards" in Cyberspace, 21 U. Dayton L. Rev. 95, 106 (1995).

14  Id. (citing Amy Knoll, Comment, Any Which Way But Loose: Nations Regulate the Internet, 4 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 275, 276).

15  Marc L. Caden & Stephanie E. Lucas, Comment, Accidents On the Information Superhighway: On-Line Liability And Regulation, 2 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 3,  4 (Feb. 13, 1996) <http://www.urich.edu/~jolt/v2i1/caden_lucas.html> (citing John W. Verity & Robert D. Hof, The Internet: How it Will Change the Way You Do Business, Bus. Wk., Nov. 14, 1994, at 80).

16  Id. (citing Brian Livingston, The Mother of All Networks: Internet, P.C. Computing, Apr. 1994, at 180).
 
17  Id. at  5 (citing Phillip E. Courtney, Untangling the Internet, Ent. Sys. J., Mar. 1995, at 16).

18  Id. (citing Verity & Hof, supra note 15).

19  Id.

20    What is the Internet?  The Internet is a world-wide information network connecting thousands of computers and millions of users.  The Internet is more than just a computer network of machines and software; it is a communications medium.  Users have the ability to gather more information, select services, conduct business, transact with others around the world, and much more.  In fact, even back in 1995, the Internet was already the fastest growing information network, increasing at a rate of more than 10% per month!  Author Unknown, About the Internet, <http://www.gblhorizon.com/info/about_internet.html/>.
 
21    Susan Hallam, Misconduct on the Information Highway: Abuse and Misuse of the Internet, in Ethics, Information and Technology Readings 241 (Richard N. Stichler & Robert Hauptman eds., 1998).
     Nearly 26 million people over the age of 18, or about 13 percent of all American adults, have home Internet access.  Carol McGarvey, Just the Facts, The Des Moines Register, Feb. 1, 1998.

22    Today, an individual sitting down at his home computer who decides to "surf the Web" is presented with a plethora of opportunities.  In fact, you can now find information on the Internet for just about any topic imaginable.  For instance, a history buff could search for information on his or her family's genealogy by visiting a site with almost 30,000 links to genealogy sites on the World Wide Web.  See <http://www.CyndisList.com/>.  A fan of the most famous English bard would be able to read from Shakespeare's complete compilation of works at <http://the-tech.mit.edu/Shakespeare/works.html/>.  An art aficionado could experience numerous masterpieces by Michelangelo ranging from his sculpture of "David" to the painting of the "Ceiling of the Sistine Chapel" at <http://mirrors.telepac.pt/CJFA/michelan/index.html/>.  Furthermore, a shopper in need of clothes wants to avoid the hassles of a shopping mall can quickly type <http://www.jcrew.com/>.  Finally, a world or domestic traveler can plan their own trip to any destination while ensuring the cheapest airfares in the process by visiting <http://www.travelresdirect.com/>.
 

23    Steve Halvonik, Lawyers in Space, Executive Report, Jan. 1, 1998 (adding that "real estate companies, car dealers, pornography purveyors, computer salesmen and newspaper and magazine publishers have led the way in developing eye-catching web pages and generating on-line business interactions").

24     According to a survey released last November by the Travel Industry Association of America, approximately 13.8 million Americans use the Internet to make vacation plans.  Another report released in February by Jupiter Communications, a New York news media research firm, found that travel is the number-one spending segment for the on-line consumer market.  In 1997 alone, Internet users booked $827 million in travel on-line.  And as more people get hooked up to the Internet, Jupiter predicts that on-line travel sales will climb to $8.9 billion by 2002.  Christine Riccelli, Flying the Web, The Des Moines Register, Mar. 15, 1998, in Travel; Joel Smith, On-line Travel Booking Growth Hits Stratosphere, The Des Moines Register, Mar. 2, 1998, in Metro Business.  For an excellent example of how easy it is to check flight departure, arrival, and fare information, see <http://www.travelresdirect.com/>.
     Furthermore, while only a marginal number of consumers actually purchase cars on the Internet, many more are using the resources available to arrive at a car lot feeling well informed.  This is not difficult to accomplish since there are already more than 200 web sites with automotive information, with numbers multiplying rapidly.  Many Shoppers Start Car Research on the Internet, The Des Moines Register, Nov. 23, 1997, in On the Road.  For an excellent example, see <http://www.edmunds.com/>.
 
25    Susan Hallam, supra note 11, at 241.
 

26    About the Internet, supra note _____ .
 

27    Jane Applegate, Pioneering 'interpreneurs' forge ahead on Net, D.M. Register, July 27, 1998, at 12B.  The article also points out that "[t]he number of small businesses that have home pages on the Web nearly doubled from 1996 to 1997, according to the 1997 National Small Business United/Arthur Andersen survey of small- and mid-sized companies."  Id.  "Big companies like Dell Computer Corporation use the Internet to sell $5 million worth of computers every day, and offer services like the new "Virtual Account Executive," which provides product demonstrations and on-line factory tours.  Id.

28    117 S.Ct. 1104, 137 L.Ed.2d 307 (1997).
 

29    Peter Krakaur, Internet Advertising: States of Disarray?  Are Uniform Rules a More Practical Solution?, New York Law Journal,  1 (Sept. 15, 1997) <http://www.nylf.com/tech/091597s4.html/>.
 

30    Cynthia Cotts, Sharp Rise in Web Sites By Largest Firms, Law Journal Extra,  1 (Oct. 6, 1997) <http://www.ljx.com/topstories/1002new2.html/>.

31    The Web, a subset of the Internet, is built upon the idea of hypertext and links.  These links can be within the current document or to another document or service located on a remote Internet host.  Therefore, a user is able to "jump" or "surf" from site to site with relative easy.  See Author Unknown, The World Wide Web, <http://www.gblhorizon.com/info/about_www.html/>.

32    Cynthia Cotts, supra note 20, at  1.  Mark Pruner, president of Web Counsel, an Internet consultancy based in White Plains, N.Y., said in the Fall of 1997 that, "I would bet money there are 3,000 law firms on the Net."  Id. at  2.  Pruner only sees this trend increasing, believing that some firms continue to resist an Internet presence because "older partners and their clients lack familiarity with the Web."  Id. at  5.  Still, he predicts that before long the holdouts will cave in.  "After all," he said, "many of the decision-makers at big corporations now have e-mail and are relying on the Web to get information."  Id.

33     While not the focus of this paper, the fact that each state adopts and enforces its own ethical code creates a tremendous problem when it comes to questions of jurisdiction and the internet.  For example, assume that an attorney has an office in Moline, Illinois, but has a significant number of clients who reside in Davenport, Iowa.  If he posts a web page, does his page have to conform to Illinois' rules alone?  Illinois' and Iowa's?  Any jurisdiction that he has clients in?  Any jurisdiction he is likely to receive clients from?  Any and all jurisdictions of the United States?  These are difficult and largely unanswered questions.

34          Peter Krakaur, supra note 19, at  2.

 
35    Id. at  3.
 

36   Louise L. Hill, Lawyer Advertising 1 (1993).  "For instance, when the first ship of the season arrived with a load of food, drink, or tools, mere informative notice that such goods had arrived would entice buyers in a market with no competition."  Id.; see F. Presbrey, The History and Development of Advertising 154 (reprint 1968) (1929).

37    Id.; see 1 G. Rosden & P. Rosden, The Law of Adverting §1.01 (1973 & Supp. 1990).

38   Id. at 2.
 

39   Id.; see E. Kinter, A Primer on the Law of Deceptive Practices 4 (1971).

40  Id. at 15.
 

41   Adopted in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."  U.S. Const. amend. I.

42   Id.
 

43   Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (holding.........

44     316 U.S. 52 (1942).
 

45     Id.;  This doctrine can be seen as recently as 1973 in Pittsburh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Human Relations Commission, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).

46    Lori B. Andrews, Birth of a Salesman: Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation 1 (ABA Press 1980).
     Furthermore, Canon 27 of the original Canons of Professional Ethics adopted in 1908 stated in part: "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust...." Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 27, American Bar Association (1908).

47    Id.
 

48    Supra note 9, at 33.
 

49    Id.; See also, supra note 7.
 

50    If a right is found to be absolute, it is in a preferred position and, by definition, is not subject to judicial balancing.  See R. Rotunda et al., Constitutional Law 942 (1991).  The belief that the freedom of speech is not absolute, but rather subject to judicial balancing is the position adopted by the majority of the courts.  See 1 G. Rosden & P. Rosden, The Law of Adverting §5.02 (1973 & Supp. 1990).

51    Louise L. Hill, supra note _____ , at 16 (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943)).  See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153 n.4 (1938).

52    Id.; see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

53    Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (footnotes omitted).

54    Louise L. Hill at 17.
 

55    See Note, Constitutional Law---First Amendment Protection of Commercial Speech---Bolger V. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 32 Kan. L. Rev. 679, 685 (1984).

56    See Rotunda et al., surpra note ______ , at § 20.26.
 

57    Louise L. Hill, supra note ____ , at 24.
 

58   The principle that commercial speech is not entitled to First Amendment protection first arose in the 1942 case of Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (upholding a New York sanitation ordinance which prohibited the distribution of commercial and business advertising matter).  Notwithstanding, in the 1951 case of Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642, rehearing denied, 342 U.S.843 (1951), the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he fact that periodicals are sold does not put them beyond the protection of the First Amendment.  The selling, however, brings into the transaction a commercial feature.  The First and Fourteenth Amendments have never been treated as absolutes.  Freedom of speech or press does not mean that one can talk or distribute where, when and how one chooses.  Rights other than those of the advocates are involved.  By adjustment of rights, we can have both full liberty and an orderly life."

59    333 F.Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).  See Rotunda et al., supra note _____ , at § 20.31.

60    405 U.S. at 1000.
 

61    333 F.Supp. at 584.
 

62    Id. at 590 (Skelly Wright, J., dissenting).
63    Id. at 587.
 

64    See Rotunda et al., supra note ____ , at § 20.31.
 

65    Louise L. Hill, supra note ______ , at 28.
 

66    Id.; see C. Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech 25 (1989).

67    Louise L. Hill, supra note ______ , at 28.
     In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973), a newpaper was charged with violating an ordinance which prohibited the placement of advertisements in sex-designated columns, absent a bona fide occupational exemption.  The newspaper's stance was that the regulation violated the First Amendment in that it limited the exercise of the newpaper's editorial judgment.  Id. at 381.  The Supreme Court determined that the mandate did not infringe on the First Amendment rights of the newspaper, but in doing so, confirmed its position that editorial decisions are protected, as is the free expression of views on ideas, whether or not they are controversial.  Id. at 391.  Still, the Court found the advertisments to be classic examples of commercial speech, noting that illegal activity was involved.  Id. at 385.  When illegal activity is involved, there is no First Amendment protection and the state may restrict adverstisements which tout the illegal activity.  Louise Hill, supra note _____ , at 29.
     Two years after Pittsburgh Press, in the case of Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), the Supreme Court began to institute a principle compatable with that espoused in Pittsburgh Press.  The Bigelow Court held that a state cannot prohibit the advertising of legal activity.  Id. at 825-826.

68    425 U.S. 748 (1976); Even before the Virginia Pharmacy case, the U.S. Supreme Court considered Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).  Here, the Court held that Virginia could not criminalize advertisements in Virginia newspapers of the availability of abortions in New York.  While this case seemed to cast a different light on constitutional protection afforded commerical speech, there was still some question since the case involved an independently constitutionally protected activity.
 

69    Louise L. Hill, supra note ______ , at 31.
 

70    425 U.S. at 773.
 

71    Id. at 763-764.
 

72    Id. at 763.  See S. Shiffrin, The First Amendment, Democracy and Romance 52 (1990).

73    425 U.S. at 466-67.
 

74    Id. at 769.
 

75    Id. at 770.
 

76    Id. at 773.
 

77    Louise L. Hill, supra note _____ , at 31.
 

78    Id. at 32.  See Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Expression 63 (1984); Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 554, 562 (1991).
 

79    Id.  See Shiffrin, supra note _____ , at 53.  See generally, Donald Lively, The Supreme Court and Commercial Speech: New Words with an Old Message, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 289 (1987).

80    Id. at 773 n.25.
 

81    Id.
 

82    The Court in Virginia Pharmacy expressly reserved this question, stating: "We stress that we have considered in this case the regulation of commercial advertising by pharmacists.  Although we express no opinion as to other professions, the distinctions, historical and functional, between professions, may require consideration of quite different factors.  Physicians and lawyers, for example, do not dispense standardized products; they render professional services of almost indefinite variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility for confusion and deception if they were to undertake certain kinds of advertising."  425 U.S. at 733, n. 25.

83    433 U.S. 350 (1977).
 

84    L. Ray Patterson & Thomas B. Metzloff, Legal Ethics: The Law of Professional Responsibility § 14.04 (3rd ed. 1989).

85    433 U.S. 350 (1977).

86    Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (upholding the disciplining of an attorney who met with an injured victim while in the hospital).

87    Id.
 

88    447 U.S. 557 (1980).
 

89    Id.; "The order at issue had originally been promulgated during the energy shortage of the early 1970's when the State became concerned that it would not have sufficient fuel reserves to meet consumer demands for the 1973-74 winter."  Louise L. Hill, Lawyer Advertising 63 (1993).

90    Id. at 64.
 

91    Concerning the first leg of the four-part test, the Central Hudson Court stated that while the government may completely curb misleading or deceptive advertising and commercial speech related to illegal activity, all commercial speech that is not misleading, deceptive, or related to unlawful activity is constitutionally protected and therefore subject to a "more circumscribed" governmental power.  477 U.S. 563-64; Hill, supra note ___ at 64.
 
92    477 U.S. at 566; See Hill, supra note ___ at 64.
 

93    Hill, at 64.
 

94    Id.  In the Central Hudson Court's opinion at 569-571, pointed out that the ban might conceivably prevent the utility from advertising "products and services that use energy efficiently.

95    Hill, supra note ____ , at 65.
 

96    Id.
 

97    455 U.S. 191 (1982).
 

98    Hill, supra note ___ , at 65.  The attorney in R.M.J. was privately reprimanded for violating Missouri's version of DR 2-101(B) that allowed lawyers to "publish...in newspapers, periodicals and the yellow pages of telephone directories" a limited amount of information.  455 U.S. 191, 194 n.3 (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat., Sup. Ct. Rule 4, Addendum III (1997)).

99    455 U.S. at 205-06.
 

100    Id. at 206-07.
 

101    Id. at 206.
 

102    Id.
 

103   Hill, supra note ___ , at 66.
 

104    471 U.S. 626, 105 S.Ct. 2265 (1985).
 

105    In Zauderer, an attorney was disciplined for two advertisements which he placed in newspapers.  The first advertisement informed readers that he would represent people charged with drunk driving and would refund his fee if the client were convicted of the charge.  The Office of Disciplinary Counsel objected to this ad since state disciplinary rules prohibited the representation of criminal defendants on a contingency basis.  Even though the attorney immediately withdrew the ad, the Board of Commissioners continued reviewing the matter.  In fact, the Board did not find the offer of unethical service to be the deceptive component.  It found the deception in the possibility that the client would be convicted of a lesser offense and still be responsible for fees.  This scenario was not stated in the ad.  Hill, supra note ___ , at 67 (citing 471 U.S. 626, 629-30, 634 (1985)).
     The second ad for which the attorney was disciplined displayed an illustration of an intrauterine device, accompanied by the heading "DID YOU USE THIS IUD?," and informed readers that his firm was willing to represent females injured by their use of the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device.  Hill, supra note ___ , at 67 (citing 471 U.S. 626, 630-31).
 
106    Hill, supra note ___ , at 68 (citing 471 U.S. at 634).
 

107    Id.
 

108    Id. (citing 471 U.S. at 639-49).
 

109    Id. (citing 471 U.S. at 644, 648-49).
 

110    Hill, supra note ___ , at 68.
111    The Zauderer Court stated that "[t]he value of the information presented in appellant's advertising is no less than that contained in other forms of advertising---indeed, insofar as appellant's advertising tended to acquaint persons with their legal rights who might otherwise be shut off from effective accss to the legal system, it was undoubtedly more baluable than many other forms of advertising."  471 U.S. at 646.

112    486 U.S. 466, 108 S.Ct. 1916 (1988).
 

113    Id.
 

114    Id.
 

115    Id. at 474.
 

116    Id.; See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447, 470 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (stating "[w]hat is objectionable about Ohralik's behavior here is not so much tha the solicited business for himself, but rather the circumstances in which he performed that solicitation and the means by which he accomplished it").

117    Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475.
 

118  aba, 29

   Canon 27 of the original Canons of Professional Ethics, adopted in 1908 stated in part: "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust...." Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 27, American Bar Association (1908).
 

119  Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics & Conduct vs. Wherry, 569 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Iowa 1997).

120  425 U.S. 748, 770-771 (1976)
 

121  Id.
 

122  433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691
 

123  American Bar Association Commission on Advertising, Lawyer Advertising at the Crossroads: Professional Policy Considerations 1 (1995).
 

124  Id.
 

125  Id. at 2.
 

126  Id.
 

127     Committee on Professional Ethics v. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d 565, 567.

128    See, Iowa DR 2-101(C).

129    Humphrey I, at 569.

130    Id.

131    Humphrey II, at 645.

132    Id. at 646.

133     Id.

134     Id.

135  Gary A. Kendra, Legal and Business Dimensions of Web Development,  __ (Apr. 21, 1997) <http://www.collegehill.com/kendra.html>.

136  Marc L. Caden & Stephanie E. Lucas, Comment, Accidents On the Information Superhighway: On-Line Liability And Regulation, 2 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 3,  6 (Feb. 13, 1996) <http://www.urich.edu/~jolt/v2i1/caden_lucas.html>