Class Action Suits for Recent Law School Graduates
P.A. Henrichsen



 
 

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

II. THE BASIC METHOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2

III. ORIGINS OF CLASS ACTIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

IV. THE PUBLIC POLICY OF CLASS ACTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9

V. THE LEGAL ETHICS OF CLASS ACTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . 10

VI. THE ECONOMICS OF CLASS ACTIONS . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . 12

VII. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16


 
 

I. INTRODUCTION



 In light of recent headlines about multi-million-dollar class action settlements new law school graduates may look to class action work as a good way to make lots of money early in their legal careers.1 After three years of law school most graduates are eager to start earning a large salary.  And some young lawyers may look at the large class action awards and to the large attorney's fees that they generate as a way to fund other aspects of the legal profession such as pro bono legal work and social litigation.
 However, the way that most class actions are brought to fruition may not fit the recent law school graduates' plans.  Such suits may not be the best way to do good work for clients who deserve quality legal services but cannot afford them.  An understanding of the method and its history may prove that these large awards of attorney's fees are used to pay large bank loans and the losses incurred on cases that do not settle and do not return favorable jury awards.  The seemingly large windfalls may not be available to subsidize other legal work.2
 
 

II. THE BASIC METHOD


 



The generic class action suit involves a named plaintiff who adequately represents the class of plaintiffs that is suing.3  This named plaintiff can be anyone who has suffered a harm that is similar enough to harms suffered by the remainder of the class.4  Examples might include anything from one customer that purchased a faulty flashlight, to a small group of women who purchased plastic surgery, to a single shareholder of a large corporation.
The class of possible plaintiffs must be large enough to generate a substantial total group harm.5  If there were many separate large harms each might be pursued separately.  With small harms, however, it is not economical for each small claimant to pursue redress.  It is only by grouping their claims that each claimant's proportional share of the legal fees and other costs can be reduced to a reasonable dollar amount.
A class action suit must also involve a common legal or factual issue.6  Class actions are a grouping of similarly situated claims.7  For example, if a class action were to be brought against a large manufacturer by all of it's separate suppliers the claim would have to involve a thread that was common to each relationship.  If one supplier had a breach of contract claim and another had a tort action the two would not be permitted in the same class action.
The named representative of the class must be typical of the group harmed.8  Most often the named plaintiff will have no more of a special relationship with the suit than any other plaintiff.  This is not always the case as there are often "professional named plaintiffs" who appear as the named plaintiff in several class actions.  These individuals may have much more involvement in the suit than the other plaintiffs.  But, in general the named plaintiff has little to do with the suit.
Another important aspect of the named plaintiff is that they need to vigorously pursue the interests of the entire class.  But, when the named plaintiff is only a nominal plaintiff this is not possible.  In fact, the task of vigorously pursuing the interests of the entire class is often left to the attorneys in charge of the suit and the judge that grants certification.  For it is the attorneys who fund the class action and plan the strategies that lead to settlement or favorable jury awards.
As a general rule the initial costs of pursuing the class action are borne by the plaintiff's attorneys.  Class members are rarely asked to pay for the attorney's work before the litigation is commenced.  Rather attorneys, law firms, and banks provide the cash needed to pay those who research the case, file the claim and develop the membership of the class.  These costs may add up to hundreds of thousands of dollars and may not be recovered for some time, if at all.
This fact alone may preclude many recent law school graduates from opening a practice that focuses on class action suits.  Very few banks would lend money for this purpose to attorneys without track records.  If class actions are what recent law school graduates want to practice; joining an existing firm may be the best option.
Finally, there must not be a better alternative to the class action.9  This most often occurs with small individual harms from product defects.  It may also be the case where there has been a mass tort10 and the tort-feaser is looking for a settlement to quantify the liability.  Certification of the class goes a long way in structuring the settlement negotiations for the parties in either case. 11  Each side will attempt to craft the case to its own advantage and the class action is often the best method for doing this.
The certification process involves a properly drawn up class petitioning a judge for certification.12  The judge reviews the facts of the case as presented.  The judge then evaluates how each of the specific facts fits within the class structure.  This evaluation determines whether the class structure creates efficiencies within the judicial process.13  The judge also ascertains whether the class certification helps to avoid inconsistent decisional law.  That is, does it help to have one judge hear one large group of similar cases rather than have several judges hear several smaller cases?  One decision from one consistent set of facts makes for better case law.14
The judge also considers the protection of any absent class members when granting certification.15  Individual class members who were harmed must be identified so that they can be notified of the suit.16  Upon notification possible class members are faced with the decision to stick with the class or to opt out and pursue the claim on their own.  The decision to participate in the class action remains the individual's decision.
The judge also considers whether the aggregate of small claims helps to foster the 'private attorney general' theory of law enforcement.17  It is often through private tort actions that legal standards of care are created and enforced.18  Similarly, the rise in class action tort suits has produced an increase in product testing and safety.19 Recent law school graduates may ask, "How can we practice 'good' law and still earn a living?"  Working for a larger firm that specializes in class action cases may make it possible to work on law that helps shape the way large companies do business.  This is not necessarily the type of law practice that comes to mind as pro bono or poverty law but it can none the less produce a social benefit.  Large class action settlements and awards can force large companies to behave in a more socially acceptable manner in the future.
 
 

III. ORIGINS OF CLASS ACTIONS


 



In the beginning, group litigation did not represent a mechanism for the small, unsophisticated legal player to gang up on the large economic giant.20  The opposite was in fact true.  Class actions started as a tool to modernize the manorial and parochial systems during the beginnings of the agricultural revolution.21  Often it was the oppressor who was using the litigation to further the oppression.22
Efficiency was assumed when a landlord sued his tenants to enforce a new lease agreement.23  Each tenant would be bound prospectively by the new legal decision.  This was accepted because there was a commonality to the subject at hand.24  Each tenant had roughly the same relationship with the lord of the manor.  In this way the early class actions were almost legislative.25  The decisions affected only future relationships.
There is also an example of the class action being used to enforce a death tax upon an entire parish.26  The rector in one particular area sued his congregation for not bringing their dead to his cemetery where he would perform the service and extract the death tax.27  Again, the elements of efficiency and commonality were met in this example.  Every parish member would eventually have to be buried and the legislative nature of the decision forced payment of the tax only prospectively.
Class actions in America followed this English line of cases until the rise of associations and corporations (circa 1850's)28.  The class action was then used to enforce relationships between shareholders and corporations.29  The class action was not used very often and a strong body of case law did not develop until the rise of industrialization.30
With the rise of a mass production economy the disparity between the powerful producer and the weak consumer increased (circa 1890's to present).31  Consumers increasing bore the cost of industrialization through unlitigated torts.32  Harms were left unaddressed.33  Class actions were rediscovered as a mechanism to aggregate a large numbers of small harms together into one larger claim and thus make it economically possible to pursue.
Plaintiff's attorneys would do this by first certifying the class.34  Again the judge mandated that the similar interests of the class be served while the individual interests of each class member were also respected.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was the framework on which these decisions rested.  Early interpretations of the rule were liberal and classes were generally certified.  This resulted in a major backlash.35  As a result courts began to restrict the use of class actions and the groups that were allowed to use them.36
The advent of the mass tort37 pushed the pendulum back the other way.  In the late nineteen-seventies courts began again to use class certification in a more liberal fashion.38  The class action was again seen as a means of inducing socially and ethically responsible behavior from large and wealthy institutions.  Large awards and settlements were seen as deterrence to policies or activities that were harmful to large numbers of individuals.  This view of class actions policy is especially robust in situations where stopping the entire class action certification would put an end to the litigation and the enforcement.  Finally, the Supreme Court has noted that Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for class actions that may enhance the efficiency of private actions by permitting small consumers to combine their limited legal resources to achieve a more powerful litigation posture.39
 
 

IV. THE PUBLIC POLICY OF CLASS ACTIONS



The class action can be said to offer a great advantage to the plaintiff class in settlement negotiations.  "Class litigation achieves organization of a large group of litigants who would not find it rational to press their claims without collective action."40  With the added clout of additional claimants plaintiffs' attorneys can negotiate for and obtain larger settlements.
Once there is a settlement agreement the court must approve the details of the deal.41  The court acts as a guardian to all the class members present in order to protect their separate interests.  The court also insures that absent any statutory language specifically awarding fees the attorneys get paid only if there is a monetary award.  The court must approve both the form and the content of any settlement agreement.  The court also establishes the settlement date and allows for dissent and debate.  In sum, the court has an additional role in class action suits.  Not only does the court preside over the settlement or possible trial but it also acts as a guardian of the rights of both present and absent class members.
 
 


V. THE LEGAL ETHICS OF CLASS ACTIONS


 





Due to the large number of possible litigants modern class action law often runs afoul of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.42  To whom does the attorney owe allegiance?  According to one judge the conflicts come to a head during the settlement phase of litigation.43  Early settlement is one of the most favorable options for attorneys but may not be so favorable for the entire class.  This point is really driven home by the fact that in many class actions the attorneys front the advance money for the class and the attorneys are hurt if settlement does not happen quickly.44
Another possible ethical question is the rule against solicitation.45  This rule is brought to life by the "ambulance chaser" played by Danny Devito in the film "The Rain Maker".  But, this seemingly strong rule against solicitation has had little impact on the efforts of class action lawyers in their attempts to develop class membership.46  As it stands efforts by attorneys to collect class members will be allowed so long as the efforts are not egregious.47
Finally, perhaps, the most dangerous breach of ethics within the class action must be discussed.  That is, the possible collusion between the plaintiffs' lawyer and the defendant (defense counsel).  This situation occurs when the defendant convinces the plaintiffs' attorney to settle for an amount that is less than the projected outcome at trial.  The defendant and plaintiffs' attorney then split the difference.  Both the plaintiffs' attorney and the defendant are better off to the determent of the class action litigants.  This example of ethical breach is best prevented by strict judicial review of proposed settlements.48
 
 

VI. THE ECONOMICS OF CLASS ACTIONS


 



There are three main theories on how to calculate the amount of fees the plaintiffs' attorney should recover in the case of class actions.  They are the lodestar method, the contingency fee basis, and finally the market rate of return method.  Each method has its strengths and weaknesses.  Because attorney's fees have the potential to act as a major driving force behind an attorney's motives in representing the class members, particularly in the case of settlement, these methods of fee calculation deserve special consideration.49
The lodestar method has been around for the better part of 30 years and has been used to calculate fees in many different situations.50  In its simplest version lodestar is reasonable hours multiplied by a reasonable rate.51  The lodestar method offers the most predictability for the plaintiffs' class and the defendant.
The method does have criticism.  Lodestar tends to promote 'make work' for the attorneys.  Plaintiffs' attorneys are rewarded for work done not for work that needs to be done.  This promotes waste in an effort to increase reasonable hours.
Lodestar does not offer a valid comparison to the potential class member as applied to the decision of opting out of the class.  If a potential class member stays within the class they will pay their proportional share of the lodestar fee.  If they opt out they will most likely pay a contingency fee.  A valid comparison of predicted costs is not available in this situation.
Finally, lodestar does not promote early, advantageous, settlement, as the plaintiffs' counsel has to document time spent in order to collect under lodestar.  If an early settlement would be possible in the absence of lodestar it is not available when the plaintiffs' attorneys must justify their fee by the hours spent on the case.52  This waste of legal time is beneficial only to the plaintiffs' attorney.  Wasted time could be better spent on other class action litigation.
The second method used to evaluate fees is the contingency method.  This method borrows directly from the field of personal injury law where the plaintiffs' attorney takes a fixed percentage of any recovery.  This method works best when the courts maintain discretion to keep fees reasonable and inline with other types of contingency fee arrangements.  Under the contingency method it is understood that any excess that an attorney may recover above the actual cost of winning the class action will be used to defray the cost of class actions that are brought, not settled and subsequently lost.  This is congruent to the theory of contingency fees generally.
In any event, the courts must maintain an independent duty to protect the class.  This situation is most pronounced when part of the settlement is in cash and part of the settlement is 'in kind'.53  The class members take their percentage of the settlement in the form of vouchers or coupons and the attorneys take their percentage in the form of cash.54  As noted earlier, the court must monitor this situation for collusion between the defense and the plaintiff's attorney.55
Under the contingency fee method the court may also consider the experience of plaintiff's counsel when allowing fees.  It may also consider the difficulties of the case.  This consideration allows flexibility in awarding fees.  Some class actions are much more intensive than others.56  Courts may also consider the time actually spent on the case as justification for reducing the percentage of the fee recovery.  If the courts retain the power to modify the contingency percentage then the fee structure can be made to properly fit the amount and quality of work performed.
Under the third method of fee arrangement market forces are used to determine the proper fit.  A majority of recent court decisions have held that the percentage method of fee recovery is the ideal way to fund class action litigation.57  This recent acceptance is in light of the fact that plaintiffs' attorneys are now biding for the opportunity to represent the class.  This open market biding will help drive the cost down to the opportunity cost of the attorneys involved.58  Allowing the attorneys to set their own reasonable fees will allow market forces to drive the price down.  Class members represented by the named plaintiff could then seek out the best counsel for the price that they were willing to pay.  Competition would then ensure that cases that are "absolute wins" would return the most to the class and questionable class actions would cost the class more.  The market system would remove part of the monitoring burden from the judge.
 
 

VII. CONCLUSION



In close, large class action settlements may be attractive to recent law school graduates.  This might not truly reflect the economics of the situation, as the economics of the class action settlement are more congruent to the economics of the typical contingency fee arrangement.  Legal ethics also play a large role in class action settlements.  The class action attorney has to protect the interests of the entire class.  Recent law school graduates must realize that the history of class litigation has shifted toward more public policy oriented goals.  If shaping those ends is important to recent law school graduates then working for a large firm that specializes in plaintiff class actions might be the right choice.



1 Barry Meier, Fistfuls of Coupons: Millions for Class-Action Lawyers, Scrip for Plaintiffs, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1995, at D1.
2 See generally, Bryant Garth, Ilene H. Nagel and S. Jay Plager, The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives From an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 353 (1988).
3 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CORTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §1.01 (3d ed. 1992).
4 Id.
5 THOMAS A. DICKERSON, CLASS ACTIONS: THE LAWS OF 50 STATES § 1.01[1](1)(1992).
6 Id.
7 NEWBERG, supra note 2, § 1.05.
8 See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-42 (1942)(where the interests of those joined fairly represent those who are not the court will proceed in the litigation of the issues in which all have an interest).
9 DICKERSON supra note 5, § 1.01 [1] (5).
10 See generally JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 12 (1995)(explaining the nature of mass harms and class actions).
11 Certification is the process where the judge constructs the qualifications and limitations of the class. (i.e., who is in and who is out).
12 NEWBERG, supra note 2, § 2.05.
13 DICKERSON supra note 4, § 1.01 [2] (1).
14 Id.
15 Id., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1942).
16 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985)(determining what minimum due process was due in order for a court to exercise jurisdiction over absent class members).
17 See John C. Coffee, Jr. Understanding The Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory For Private Enforcement of Law Through Class And Derivative Actions 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669, 673 (1986)(noting that there may be over incentives for attorneys and that there may be over enforcement of some laws); John C. Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 Md. L. Rev. 215 (1983)(same).
18 John C. Coffee, Jr. Understanding The Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory For Private Enforcement of Law Through Class And Derivative Actions 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669, 673 (1986).
19 Id. at 675.
20 See generally, Stephen C. Yeazell Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward A History of the Class Action 77 Colum. L. Rev. 866.
21 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 58 (1987).
22 Id.
23 Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past and Future of Defendant and Settlement Classes in Collective Litigation, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 687, 689 (1997).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past and Future of Defendant and Settlement Classes in Collective Litigation 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 687, n. 4 Martin, Rector of Barkway v. Parishioners of Nuthamstead, in SELECT CASES FROM THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS OF THE PROVINCE OF CANTERBURY, c. 1200-1301 (Norma Adams & Charles Donahue, Jr. eds., 1981).
27 Id.
28 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1837-1937 (1991) 25.
29 See Wood River Area Dev. Corp. v. Germania Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 555 N.E. 2d 1150 (Ill 1990).
30 27 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1067, 1098.
31 HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, at 42.
32 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 201-211 (1977).
33 Id.
34 See supra Part II.
35 John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action. 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1343, 1344 (1995).
36 See generally Richard A. Nagreda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85 Geo. L.J. 295 (1996).
37 See supra note 10.
38 Prior to the revision of Federal Civil Procedure Rule 23 in 1966, there were three categories of class action, commonly known as "true", "hybrid", and "spurious."  These categories no longer exist under the present Rule 23.
39 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. (1972) 405 U.S. 251, 31 L. Ed. 2d 184, 92 S. Ct. 885, 1972 CCh Trade Cases P 73862, 15 FR Serv 2d 1384, 2 ELR 20133.
40 Stephen C. Yeazell, Collective Litigation As Collective Action 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 43, 56 (1986).
41 See Weinberg v. Kendrick, 698 F. 2d 61 (2d. Cir. 1983).
42 Specifically MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1996):
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client unless
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client of to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.  When representation of multiple clients on a singled matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved.
43 See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 61 (1995)(discussing the divergence of interests between the attorney and the plaintiff at the time of settlement).
44 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 731 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987)(demonstrating the fact that attorneys can go bankrupt by bringing mass tort claims that do not settle fast).
45 Model Rule 7.3 prohibits lawyers from "soliciting professional employment from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family of prior relationship when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is for the lawyer's pecuniary gain."
46 Michael Higgins, Tempting Targets: Mass-tort Lawyer Among Those Facing Criminal Charges. 83 Jul. ABA J. 26, 26 (1997)(noting that there has been only three reported cases of criminal indictments since 1970).
47 Id.
48 See, Weinberg v. Kendrick, 698 F. 2d 61 (1983).
49 Genine C. Swanzey, Using Class Actions to Litigate Mass Torts: Is There Justice for the Individual? 11 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 421, 431 (1998).
50 See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 559 (1992)(citing Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986).
51 See General Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W. 2d 949, 960 (Tex. 1996)(noting that under lodestar the court must calculate both a reasonable rate and a reasonable number of hours).
52 See e.g., City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 566, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed. 2d 449 (1992)(citing Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 104 (Apr. 2, 1990)(noting that the lodestar method may give an incentive to work and bill unneeded hours).
53 See In re General Motors Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 821 (3d Cir. 1995)(class members received a rebate on the purchase of a new vehicle).
54 Id.
55 See supra, Part V.
56 For example, class actions that involve environmental harms involve much more specific knowledge than a class action over fees charged by a stockbroker.
57 See, e.g., In re General Motors Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 821 (3d Cir. 1995), cert denied 116 S. Ct. 88(1995)(noting that "courts use the percentage of recovery method in common fund cases on the theory that the class would be unjustly enriched if it did not compensate counsel responsible for generating the valuable fund bestowed on the class"); In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 572-73 (7th Cir. 1992)(holding that "class counsel are entitled to the fee they would have received had they handled a similar suit on a contingent fee basis, with a similar outcome, for a paying client"); see also Manual for Complex Litigation § 24.121 at 189 (3d ed. 1995)(noting "[h]istorically, attorney's fees were awarded from a common fund based on a percentage of that fund," and that the lodestar method is cumbersome and difficult to apply).
58 See Charles Silver, A Restitution Theory of Attorney's Fees in Class Actions 76 Cornell L. Rev. 656, 701 n. 217 ("It seems reasonable that the price would fall somewhere between the total amount a class stands to gain and an attorney's opportunity wage); see also, Kirchoff v. Flynn, 786 F.2d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 1986).