I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1II. THE BASIC METHOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
III. ORIGINS OF CLASS ACTIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
IV. THE PUBLIC POLICY OF CLASS ACTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
V. THE LEGAL ETHICS OF CLASS ACTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
VI. THE ECONOMICS OF CLASS ACTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
VII. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
I. INTRODUCTION
In light of recent headlines about multi-million-dollar class
action settlements new law school graduates may look to class action work
as a good way to make lots of money early in their legal careers.1
After three years of law school most graduates are eager to start earning
a large salary. And some young lawyers may look at the large class
action awards and to the large attorney's fees that they generate as a
way to fund other aspects of the legal profession such as pro bono legal
work and social litigation.
However, the way that most class actions are brought to fruition
may not fit the recent law school graduates' plans. Such suits may
not be the best way to do good work for clients who deserve quality legal
services but cannot afford them. An understanding of the method and
its history may prove that these large awards of attorney's fees are used
to pay large bank loans and the losses incurred on cases that do not settle
and do not return favorable jury awards. The seemingly large windfalls
may not be available to subsidize other legal work.2
II. THE BASIC METHOD
The generic class action suit involves a named plaintiff who adequately
represents the class of plaintiffs that is suing.3 This
named plaintiff can be anyone who has suffered a harm that is similar enough
to harms suffered by the remainder of the class.4 Examples
might include anything from one customer that purchased a faulty flashlight,
to a small group of women who purchased plastic surgery, to a single shareholder
of a large corporation.
The class of possible plaintiffs must be large enough to generate a
substantial total group harm.5 If there were many separate
large harms each might be pursued separately. With small harms, however,
it is not economical for each small claimant to pursue redress. It
is only by grouping their claims that each claimant's proportional share
of the legal fees and other costs can be reduced to a reasonable dollar
amount.
A class action suit must also involve a common legal or factual issue.6
Class actions are a grouping of similarly situated claims.7
For example, if a class action were to be brought against a large manufacturer
by all of it's separate suppliers the claim would have to involve a thread
that was common to each relationship. If one supplier had a breach
of contract claim and another had a tort action the two would not be permitted
in the same class action.
The named representative of the class must be typical of the group
harmed.8 Most often the named plaintiff will have no more
of a special relationship with the suit than any other plaintiff.
This is not always the case as there are often "professional named plaintiffs"
who appear as the named plaintiff in several class actions. These
individuals may have much more involvement in the suit than the other plaintiffs.
But, in general the named plaintiff has little to do with the suit.
Another important aspect of the named plaintiff is that they need to
vigorously pursue the interests of the entire class. But, when the
named plaintiff is only a nominal plaintiff this is not possible.
In fact, the task of vigorously pursuing the interests of the entire class
is often left to the attorneys in charge of the suit and the judge that
grants certification. For it is the attorneys who fund the class
action and plan the strategies that lead to settlement or favorable jury
awards.
As a general rule the initial costs of pursuing the class action are
borne by the plaintiff's attorneys. Class members are rarely asked
to pay for the attorney's work before the litigation is commenced.
Rather attorneys, law firms, and banks provide the cash needed to pay those
who research the case, file the claim and develop the membership of the
class. These costs may add up to hundreds of thousands of dollars
and may not be recovered for some time, if at all.
This fact alone may preclude many recent law school graduates from
opening a practice that focuses on class action suits. Very few banks
would lend money for this purpose to attorneys without track records.
If class actions are what recent law school graduates want to practice;
joining an existing firm may be the best option.
Finally, there must not be a better alternative to the class action.9
This most often occurs with small individual harms from product defects.
It may also be the case where there has been a mass tort10 and
the tort-feaser is looking for a settlement to quantify the liability.
Certification of the class goes a long way in structuring the settlement
negotiations for the parties in either case. 11 Each side
will attempt to craft the case to its own advantage and the class action
is often the best method for doing this.
The certification process involves a properly drawn up class petitioning
a judge for certification.12 The judge reviews the facts
of the case as presented. The judge then evaluates how each of the
specific facts fits within the class structure. This evaluation determines
whether the class structure creates efficiencies within the judicial process.13
The judge also ascertains whether the class certification helps to avoid
inconsistent decisional law. That is, does it help to have one judge
hear one large group of similar cases rather than have several judges hear
several smaller cases? One decision from one consistent set of facts
makes for better case law.14
The judge also considers the protection of any absent class members
when granting certification.15 Individual class members
who were harmed must be identified so that they can be notified of the
suit.16 Upon notification possible class members are faced
with the decision to stick with the class or to opt out and pursue the
claim on their own. The decision to participate in the class action
remains the individual's decision.
The judge also considers whether the aggregate of small claims helps
to foster the 'private attorney general' theory of law enforcement.17
It is often through private tort actions that legal standards of care are
created and enforced.18 Similarly, the rise in class action
tort suits has produced an increase in product testing and safety.19
Recent law school graduates may ask, "How can we practice 'good' law and
still earn a living?" Working for a larger firm that specializes
in class action cases may make it possible to work on law that helps shape
the way large companies do business. This is not necessarily the
type of law practice that comes to mind as pro bono or poverty law but
it can none the less produce a social benefit. Large class action
settlements and awards can force large companies to behave in a more socially
acceptable manner in the future.
III. ORIGINS OF CLASS ACTIONS
In the beginning, group litigation did not represent a mechanism for
the small, unsophisticated legal player to gang up on the large economic
giant.20 The opposite was in fact true. Class actions
started as a tool to modernize the manorial and parochial systems during
the beginnings of the agricultural revolution.21 Often
it was the oppressor who was using the litigation to further the oppression.22
Efficiency was assumed when a landlord sued his tenants to enforce
a new lease agreement.23 Each tenant would be bound prospectively
by the new legal decision. This was accepted because there was a
commonality to the subject at hand.24 Each tenant had
roughly the same relationship with the lord of the manor. In this
way the early class actions were almost legislative.25
The decisions affected only future relationships.
There is also an example of the class action being used to enforce
a death tax upon an entire parish.26 The rector in one
particular area sued his congregation for not bringing their dead to his
cemetery where he would perform the service and extract the death tax.27
Again, the elements of efficiency and commonality were met in this example.
Every parish member would eventually have to be buried and the legislative
nature of the decision forced payment of the tax only prospectively.
Class actions in America followed this English line of cases until
the rise of associations and corporations (circa 1850's)28.
The class action was then used to enforce relationships between shareholders
and corporations.29 The class action was not used very
often and a strong body of case law did not develop until the rise of industrialization.30
With the rise of a mass production economy the disparity between the
powerful producer and the weak consumer increased (circa 1890's to present).31
Consumers increasing bore the cost of industrialization through unlitigated
torts.32 Harms were left unaddressed.33
Class actions were rediscovered as a mechanism to aggregate a large numbers
of small harms together into one larger claim and thus make it economically
possible to pursue.
Plaintiff's attorneys would do this by first certifying the class.34
Again the judge mandated that the similar interests of the class be served
while the individual interests of each class member were also respected.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was the framework on which these decisions
rested. Early interpretations of the rule were liberal and classes
were generally certified. This resulted in a major backlash.35
As a result courts began to restrict the use of class actions and the groups
that were allowed to use them.36
The advent of the mass tort37 pushed the pendulum back the
other way. In the late nineteen-seventies courts began again to use
class certification in a more liberal fashion.38 The class
action was again seen as a means of inducing socially and ethically responsible
behavior from large and wealthy institutions. Large awards and settlements
were seen as deterrence to policies or activities that were harmful to
large numbers of individuals. This view of class actions policy is
especially robust in situations where stopping the entire class action
certification would put an end to the litigation and the enforcement.
Finally, the Supreme Court has noted that Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provides for class actions that may enhance the efficiency
of private actions by permitting small consumers to combine their limited
legal resources to achieve a more powerful litigation posture.39
IV. THE PUBLIC POLICY OF CLASS ACTIONS
The class action can be said to offer a great advantage to the plaintiff
class in settlement negotiations. "Class litigation achieves organization
of a large group of litigants who would not find it rational to press their
claims without collective action."40 With the added clout
of additional claimants plaintiffs' attorneys can negotiate for and obtain
larger settlements.
Once there is a settlement agreement the court must approve the details
of the deal.41 The court acts as a guardian to all the
class members present in order to protect their separate interests.
The court also insures that absent any statutory language specifically
awarding fees the attorneys get paid only if there is a monetary award.
The court must approve both the form and the content of any settlement
agreement. The court also establishes the settlement date and allows
for dissent and debate. In sum, the court has an additional role
in class action suits. Not only does the court preside over the settlement
or possible trial but it also acts as a guardian of the rights of both
present and absent class members.
V. THE LEGAL ETHICS OF CLASS ACTIONS
Due to the large number of possible litigants modern class action law
often runs afoul of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.42
To whom does the attorney owe allegiance? According to one judge
the conflicts come to a head during the settlement phase of litigation.43
Early settlement is one of the most favorable options for attorneys but
may not be so favorable for the entire class. This point is really
driven home by the fact that in many class actions the attorneys front
the advance money for the class and the attorneys are hurt if settlement
does not happen quickly.44
Another possible ethical question is the rule against solicitation.45
This rule is brought to life by the "ambulance chaser" played by Danny
Devito in the film "The Rain Maker". But, this seemingly strong rule
against solicitation has had little impact on the efforts of class action
lawyers in their attempts to develop class membership.46
As it stands efforts by attorneys to collect class members will be allowed
so long as the efforts are not egregious.47
Finally, perhaps, the most dangerous breach of ethics within the class
action must be discussed. That is, the possible collusion between
the plaintiffs' lawyer and the defendant (defense counsel). This
situation occurs when the defendant convinces the plaintiffs' attorney
to settle for an amount that is less than the projected outcome at trial.
The defendant and plaintiffs' attorney then split the difference.
Both the plaintiffs' attorney and the defendant are better off to the determent
of the class action litigants. This example of ethical breach is
best prevented by strict judicial review of proposed settlements.48
VI. THE ECONOMICS OF CLASS ACTIONS
There are three main theories on how to calculate the amount of fees
the plaintiffs' attorney should recover in the case of class actions.
They are the lodestar method, the contingency fee basis, and finally the
market rate of return method. Each method has its strengths and weaknesses.
Because attorney's fees have the potential to act as a major driving force
behind an attorney's motives in representing the class members, particularly
in the case of settlement, these methods of fee calculation deserve special
consideration.49
The lodestar method has been around for the better part of 30 years
and has been used to calculate fees in many different situations.50
In its simplest version lodestar is reasonable hours multiplied by a reasonable
rate.51 The lodestar method offers the most predictability
for the plaintiffs' class and the defendant.
The method does have criticism. Lodestar tends to promote 'make
work' for the attorneys. Plaintiffs' attorneys are rewarded for work
done not for work that needs to be done. This promotes waste in an
effort to increase reasonable hours.
Lodestar does not offer a valid comparison to the potential class member
as applied to the decision of opting out of the class. If a potential
class member stays within the class they will pay their proportional share
of the lodestar fee. If they opt out they will most likely pay a
contingency fee. A valid comparison of predicted costs is not available
in this situation.
Finally, lodestar does not promote early, advantageous, settlement,
as the plaintiffs' counsel has to document time spent in order to collect
under lodestar. If an early settlement would be possible in the absence
of lodestar it is not available when the plaintiffs' attorneys must justify
their fee by the hours spent on the case.52 This waste
of legal time is beneficial only to the plaintiffs' attorney. Wasted
time could be better spent on other class action litigation.
The second method used to evaluate fees is the contingency method.
This method borrows directly from the field of personal injury law where
the plaintiffs' attorney takes a fixed percentage of any recovery.
This method works best when the courts maintain discretion to keep fees
reasonable and inline with other types of contingency fee arrangements.
Under the contingency method it is understood that any excess that an attorney
may recover above the actual cost of winning the class action will be used
to defray the cost of class actions that are brought, not settled and subsequently
lost. This is congruent to the theory of contingency fees generally.
In any event, the courts must maintain an independent duty to protect
the class. This situation is most pronounced when part of the settlement
is in cash and part of the settlement is 'in kind'.53
The class members take their percentage of the settlement in the form of
vouchers or coupons and the attorneys take their percentage in the form
of cash.54 As noted earlier, the court must monitor this
situation for collusion between the defense and the plaintiff's attorney.55
Under the contingency fee method the court may also consider the experience
of plaintiff's counsel when allowing fees. It may also consider the
difficulties of the case. This consideration allows flexibility in
awarding fees. Some class actions are much more intensive than others.56
Courts may also consider the time actually spent on the case as justification
for reducing the percentage of the fee recovery. If the courts retain
the power to modify the contingency percentage then the fee structure can
be made to properly fit the amount and quality of work performed.
Under the third method of fee arrangement market forces are used to
determine the proper fit. A majority of recent court decisions have
held that the percentage method of fee recovery is the ideal way to fund
class action litigation.57 This recent acceptance is in
light of the fact that plaintiffs' attorneys are now biding for the opportunity
to represent the class. This open market biding will help drive the
cost down to the opportunity cost of the attorneys involved.58
Allowing the attorneys to set their own reasonable fees will allow market
forces to drive the price down. Class members represented by the
named plaintiff could then seek out the best counsel for the price that
they were willing to pay. Competition would then ensure that cases
that are "absolute wins" would return the most to the class and questionable
class actions would cost the class more. The market system would
remove part of the monitoring burden from the judge.
VII. CONCLUSION
In close, large class action settlements may be attractive to recent law school graduates. This might not truly reflect the economics of the situation, as the economics of the class action settlement are more congruent to the economics of the typical contingency fee arrangement. Legal ethics also play a large role in class action settlements. The class action attorney has to protect the interests of the entire class. Recent law school graduates must realize that the history of class litigation has shifted toward more public policy oriented goals. If shaping those ends is important to recent law school graduates then working for a large firm that specializes in plaintiff class actions might be the right choice.