Perhaps the most important question facing a law student is "where will I work when I graduate?"  The possibilities, of course, are vast.  In determining where to work, a student must further ask herself "what do I care about?"  If the answer is maximizing income, the choice of where to work may be relatively narrow and easy.  Large corporate law firms generally pay the most.  Moreover, many regularly publish their starting salaries, and this information may be available in a law school's career placement office.  With a bit more research, a student can estimate her odds of making partner, and what she is likely to earn as a partner.

 However, some students take professional responsibility seriously, and want to serve the legal needs of the poor, protect the rights of consumers, or advance some public interest cause.  For them, the choice of where to work may be considerably wider and more complex.  This is particularly so if earning a living is also a concern.

 For those interested in serving the needs of criminal defendants who are unable to pay for their representation, court appointments, or state or federal public defenders may be attractive possibilities.  The U.S. Constitution provides that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel, and both state and federal governments fund programs to ensure representation of the poor (whether this is adequate is a matter beyond the scope of this paper).

 For students concerned with the civil legal needs of the poor, or with protecting consumers, the environment, or civil rights, career options include both public and private employment.  This paper's focus is the option of working for large private firms that fund the pro bono work of their employees.  This option may be attractive to a student for a number of reasons.  Large law firms generally provide a much higher starting salary and greater long term earning potential than government or non-profit employers.  Large firms may also better suit the interests of many students who wish to do pro bono work.  Many, probably most, students with an interest in serving the legal needs of the poor do not plan to make it their life's work, but nonetheless consider it a professional and/or moral responsibility.

It is widely acknowledged that a majority of indigent persons in the United States lack access to legal representation in civil matters, even when faced with such threats as loss of residence or of government benefits necessary for subsistence.1  This situation, which has long existed, has been worsened by the cutbacks in funding for the Legal Services Corporation during the 1980's.2  In the early 1990's, empirical studies at both state and national levels suggest that only 15-20% of the critical legal needs of low-income persons were being met.3

A good deal of consideration has been given to the role that the private bar can play in increasing the representation of the poor in civil matters.  This paper will consider what a law student can do to assess the pro bono opportunities at large law firms in order to make informed decisions regarding future employment.  This paper will also address law firms' current efforts to represent the poor, the economic impact such efforts have on firms, and proposals for what law firms can and should do in the future.  In particular, it will focus on the feasibility and desirability of mandatory pro bono in civil cases.

Black's Law Dictionary defines pro bono as legal services that are "performed free of charge."4  This definition, however, seems both too broad and too narrow.  It is too broad in that it would include, for example, lawyers doing tax work for other lawyers or staff in their firm.  For our purposes, it is limited to services that benefit those who are unable to afford legal services, such as indigent individuals and non-profit public interest organizations.  It may be too narrow in that it should include not only direct representation of indigent clients, but also positions in organizations that provide free legal services, bar association activities which address legal problems of the indigent or public interest law, and public policy "think tanks."
Because the definition offered by Black's Law Dictionary suffers from these defects, The Pro Bono Institute's definition of pro bono will be used for purposes of this paper.5

In general, newly hired associates at large firms are paid a salary.  Most firms require associates to bill a minimum number of hours per year. A billable hour is an hour of work that can be charged to a client.  Pro Bono work, as it is not charged to a client, is not "billable."

For the student interested in doing pro bono work in the context of a large law firm, a number of considerations are important.  One such consideration is whether the firm gives billable hour credit to associates for pro bono work.  While an hour spent on pro bono work is not billable, some firms treat an hour of pro bono work as if it were billable for purposes of the billable hours requirement.  Pro bono may be considered as if it were billable for purposes of associate retention and advancement opportunities within the firm as well.  While a number of firms credit pro bono hours as billable, some firms limit the number of pro bono hours (commonly around fifty hours per year) which will be credited as billable hours, while other firms have no official maximum.  Most firms that give billable hour credit for pro bono will make this practice clear in the materials they distribute to prospective associates and summer associates, since this is generally viewed as a selling point designed to attract aspiring lawyers-to-be.  This information is also generally available on firms' websites.

An associate interested in pro bono work must also consider her firm's expectations (or requirements) regarding minimum billable hours.  Because the associate's time is limited, she must be realistic about the amount of pro bono she is likely to have the time to do.  To take a specific example, if an associate wishes to do 200 hours of pro bono service, this may be feasible at Gray, Plant, and Mooty, whose minimum billable hour requirement is 1680 hours annually.6  It is far less likely to be feasible at Peterson and Ross, which requires at least 2000 billable hours annually.7  These requirements are available on National Association for Law Placement8 (NALP) Law Firm Questionnaires, which can be found in law school placement offices.

Keep in mind, however, that minimum billable hours requirements are just that: the minimum.  These requirements may in be significantly lower than what a new associate is truly expected to bill.  Billing the minimum is not likely to put an associate on the fast track to partner.  A better guide to what is expected of a new associate may be the average annual associates' billable hours, which are often much higher than the minimum.  Some firms, such as Faegre and Benson, do not have official minimum billable hours requirements,9 but this should not be taken to mean that they do not have minimum expectations of their associates.  Information on average associate billable hours is also available on the NALP Law Firm Questionnaires in law school placement offices.

In order to accurately predict the number of pro bono hours one could feasibly do, it is important to note that the number of hours billed (or credited as billable) is not equal to the total number of hours worked.  In fact, some estimates claim that total hours worked is likely to be fifty percent higher than the number of hours billed.10

Many firms claim to encourage pro bono, but it can be difficult to assess whether it is in fact looked upon as a lesser concern -or even as a necessary evil- just to attract potential associates.  Perhaps the best way to determine the firm's attitude is to consider whether and to what extent partners participate in pro bono.  This can be somewhat more difficult information to gather, but the following section may help in this respect.

In 1993, the Pro Bono Institute issued the Law Firm Pro Bono Challenge to the nation's largest law firms.  The appendix of this paper contains the pledge signed by those firms that accepted the Law Firm Pro Bono Challenge, as well as a list of firms that have made the pledge to commit at least the equivalent of three percent of their billable hours to pro bono work.  While this list is useful in assessing the pro bono opportunities at large law firms, it is only a first step in such an assessment.  Vast differences exist among the firms who have committed to the Pro Bono Challenge, which is, after all, quite minimal in that it only requires a commitment of the equivalent of three percent of the firms billable hours to be dedicated to pro bono work.  Many of the firms only contribute at or near the minimum level, which translates to approximately fifty hours per attorney per year. Other firms, however, regularly donate as many as 200 to 250 hours per attorney per year to pro bono programs.  The website links below are a valuable resource for determining how many hours an associate can expect to contribute to pro bono work.

 The websites are also valuable in allowing the student to match her pro bono interests to the pro bono work available at the different firms.  Most firms list areas in which pro bono work is generally donated, and many list particular clients and projects with which they have been associated.

 A law student should keep in mind, however, that these websites, because they are produced by the firms themselves, might be less than objective in their portrayal of their pro bono programs.  These websites exist, after all, primarily for the purpose of self-promotion, and thus should be read with a skeptical eye.  Other sources exist, however, which may be useful in assessing the pro bono programs of the large firms.  The December 1998 issue of The American Lawyer, for example, ranks what it considers the 100 leading Pro Bono firms, based on the firms' commitment over the preceding five years.  The American Lawyer's website (www.americanlawyer.com) also contains an associates survey that includes, among other things, information on associates and summer associates perception of the firm's attitude toward pro bono.  The 1999 associates survey is available at http://www.lawnewsnetwork.com.

This section will briefly trace the history of pro bono, both mandatory and voluntary. Some legal historians trace the practice of mandatory pro bono work to the ecclesiastical courts of the thirteenth century, others to the English courts.11  English common law granted a right to counsel for treason in 1695, and allowed counsel for all felonies in 1836.  In 1903, the Poor Prisoner's Defense Act authorized the appointment of counsel for all criminal indictments if a defendant could not afford one or if justice so required, but provided that to have counsel appointed, an indigent had to reveal his defense to the court in front of his adversary.12  Eventually, Parliament enacted the Legal Aid and Advice Act, which provided legal assistance in virtually every case, civil or criminal.13

 In the United States, the Sixth Amendment forms the basis for a criminal defendant's right to Counsel.  Unlike criminal cases, however, the right to counsel is unclear in civil cases.  28 U.S.C. sec. 1915 governs a civil indigent's access to federal courts.  After some confusion, the Supreme Court in Mallard held that sec. 1915 did not authorize a federal court to mandate an unwilling attorney to represent an indigent client in a civil context (focusing on the term "request").14

 Organized voluntary pro bono programs have existed at least since the beginning of the twentieth century in the United States.15  For a number of reasons, however, voluntary pro bono efforts have declined throughout much of this century.  The legal Services Corporation was created, federal funding was increased for legal services provided to the poor in civil cases, and the right to appointed counsel in criminal cases was expanded.16

 Voluntary pro bono programs, however, saw unprecedented growth in the 1980s.  In 1981, the Reagan administration threatened to eliminate the Legal Services Corporation.  Funding was eventually retained, but at a drastically reduced level.  As a result, "the organized bar at the national, state, and local levels, became acutely aware of the unmet need for legal services and of the diminishing resources available to meet that need.  This consciousness manifested itself in unremitting support for increased funding for legal services on the part of lawyers and the organized bar.  Within the ABA and in many communities, it also led to the adoption of expanded voluntary pro bono services as one of the bar's major priorities."17

 While there were only approximately fifty voluntary pro bono programs in existence in 1981, by the end of the decade that number had increased more than tenfold.18  Despite this unparalleled growth, however, a vast majority of lawyers are not involved in pro bono organizations for the poor,19 at a time when the poor's unmet need for civil legal services is near eighty percent.20  Further, there appears to be a trend toward stagnancy among voluntary pro bono programs, due in large part to changes in the economics of law practice, particularly at large firms.21  Law firms have undoubtedly become more business-like in recent years, with an increasing emphasis on the bottom line.22  The reasons for this trend are beyond the scope of this paper, but the effect is worth noting: the increased emphasis on the bottom line has made encouraging large law firms' pro bono efforts more difficult.23  (The relationship between large law firms' economic performance and pro bono services will be considered in Section VIII.)

In light of these trends, it is not surprising that some lawyers and scholars have called for mandatory pro bono obligations.  My primary concern in this section will be the desirability of mandatory pro bono requirements,24 and the arguments for and against such obligations.  I will also discuss alternatives such as increased government funding for programs such as the Legal Services Corporation.

Proponents of mandatory pro bono find support for such obligations in historical justifications, including the "officer of the court" argument.25  According to this argument, attorneys must, as officers of the court, assist as necessary in the administration of justice.  A lawyer, as officer of the court, has a historical professional responsibility to render legal services to the poor.  Because of this, the argument claims, a lawyer implicitly consents too these obligations upon entering the profession.26

Some scholars reject this argument, however, on the grounds that American lawyers are not officers of the court in the way that this argument presumes.  English sergeants-at-law, they contend, may have been officers of the court, since they had the exclusive right to practice in the Court of Common Pleas.27  Modern U.S. attorneys, however, are more akin to English barristers, who have never been considered officers of the court.28

 Another argument in support of mandatory pro bono service is that lawyers owe an ethical duty to perform public service.  In light of the unmet needs of the poor and disadvantaged, any conventional moral system counsels in favor of pro bono service.  Whether one believes in Utilitarianism, the virtue-based ethics of Aristotle, or the duty-based system of Kant, one who is able ought to provide such services.  Lawyer's who are not versed in moral philosophy are more likely to cite the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in making the argument that lawyers owe an ethical duty to provide pro bono work.  The Model Rules provides that "a lawyer should aspire to render at least fifty hours of pro bono publico legal services per year."29  This ethical duty imposed by the Model Rules is aspirational in nature, however, and does not provide sanctions for failure to perform pro bono work.30

Within a mandatory pro bono system, it is debatable whether requirements ought to be individualized (e.g. fifty hours of service from every attorney) or collective (e.g. aggregated services of the firm totaling an average of fifty hours per attorney).  Mandatory pro bono proponents who emphasize the ethical justifications are more likely to favor an individual obligation, since it is a duty to which everyone is equally subject.  Those who focus on more instrumental justifications for mandatory pro bono, however, may favor a collective approach.  An aggregated duty may be more efficient and result in a higher quality of work, since a few specialists, better trained in the requisite areas of practice can meet the firms entire obligation.31

 One need not disagree that there exists a need, or even an obligation, in order to oppose mandatory pro bono requirements.

The legal needs of the poor, it can be argued, are public problems and should not be forced on private actors.32  Rather, they should be dealt with publicly.  It is the collective responsibility of the society, not the bar, to implement and fund legal services for the poor.  Passing legislation to adequately fund the Legal Services Corporation, for example, could meet the need without undue burden on any particular group.

Opponents also argue that mandatory pro bono will create problems regarding the quality of legal services.  Poverty law is a specialized field in which most attorneys are not sufficiently versed.  As a result, the quality of services under a mandatory system may be ineffective.33 A related argument is that compulsory services are economically inefficient allocation of resources; requiring donations of money to fund legal aid projects staffed by specialists would be more cost effective.34

Aside from the ethical justifications, a number of practical arguments suggest that firms should support voluntary pro bono service.  Assuming that recent law school graduates are not only interested in money, pro bono programs may attract the best students (or at least increase the pool of applicants).  Pro bono also provides an opportunity for young associates to gain valuable experience in litigation.35  Pro bono service can also promote a positive public image of the firm and can lead to business contacts.36

While these considerations weigh in favor of pro bono service by large law firms, empirical analysis done in the early 1990s indicates a statistically significant negative relationship between pro bono and economic performance in the 100 largest firms in the U.S.37  In an effort to assess the potential effects of mandatory pro bono, a study was undertaken to analyze, among other things, the relationship between pro bono work and law firms' economic performance.38  The study assigned a grade to each firm, from A to D, based upon two factors.  The firm's average number of pro bono hours per attorney comprised two thirds of the score.  The remaining third of the score was based on the percentage of attorneys who did in excess of twenty hours of pro bono work annually.39

The data indicate that pro bono service is negatively related to a firm's profitability.  Pro bono is non-billable, and thus as firms increase the amount of pro bono work, their economic performance generally decreases.  The chart below shows firm performance based on seven measures: "GROSS" refers to total revenues minus reimbursements for costs advanced by the firm; "REVLAW" refers to total revenue divided by the total number of lawyers in the firm; "COST" refers to the total costs of personnel and overhead; "COSTLAW" refers to the total cost divided by the total number of lawyers; "NET" refers to the total revenue minus total cost; "PROF" refers to the net operating income divided by the number of partners; and "PROFLAW" refers to the net operating income divided by the total number of lawyers.40
 
 

Firm Performance Variable	A	B	C	D	F	All Firms
GROSS	142	94	136	167	132	146
REVLAW	0.368	0.319	0.359	0.415	0.394	0.381
COST	91	63	88	106	87	93
COSTLAW	0.22	0.21	0.23	0.26	0.26	0.24
NET	52	32	49	61	46	52
PROF	0.421	0.307	0.391	0.502	0.419	0.433
PROFLAW	0.15	0.11	0.13	0.15	0.14	0.14

All figures shown are millions of dollars, rounded to the nearest million.41

A. The Pro Bono Challenge

Those who accepted The Pro Bono Institute's Law Firm Pro Bono Challenge signed the following pledge:

Recognizing the growing severity of the unmet legal needs of the poor and disadvantaged in the communities we serve, and mindful that major law firms must -- in the finest traditions of our profession -- play a leading role in addressing these unmet needs, our firm is pleased to join with other firms across the country in subscribing to the following statement of principles and in pledging our best efforts to achieve the voluntary goals described below.

1. Our firm recognizes its institutional obligation to encourage and support the participation by all of its attorneys in pro bono publico activities. We agree to promulgate and maintain a clearly articulated and commonly understood firm policy which unequivocally states the firm's commitment to pro bono work.

2. To underscore our institutional commitment to pro bono activities, we agree to use our best efforts to ensure that, by no later than the close of calendar year 1995, our firm will either:

(a) annually contribute, at a minimum, an amount of time equal to 5 percent of the firm's total billable hours to pro bono work;

or

(b) annually contribute, at a minimum, an amount of time equal to 3 percent of the firm's total billable hours to pro bono work.

3. In recognition of the special needs of the poor for legal services, we believe that our firm's pro bono activities should be particularly focused on providing access to the justice system for persons otherwise unable to afford it. Accordingly, in meeting the voluntary goals described above, we agree that a majority of the minimum pro bono time contributed by our firm should consist of the delivery of legal services on a pro bono basis to persons of limited means or to charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters which are designed primarily to address the needs of persons of limited means.

4. Recognizing that broad-based participation in pro bono activities is desirable, our firm agrees that, in meeting the minimum goals described above, we will use our best efforts to ensure that a majority of both partners and associates in the firm participate annually in pro bono activities.

5. In furtherance of these principles, our firm also agrees:

(a) To provide a broad range of pro bono opportunities, training, and supervision to attorneys in the firm, to ensure that all of our attorneys can avail themselves of the opportunity to do pro bono work;

(b) To ensure that the firm's policies with respect to evaluation, advancement, productivity, and compensation of its attorneys are compatible with the firm's strong commitment to encourage and support substantial pro bono participation by all attorneys; and

(c) To monitor the firm's progress toward the goals established in this statement and to report its progress annually to the members of the firm and to the American Bar Association's Law Firm Pro Bono Project.

7. As used in this statement, the term pro bono refers to activities of the firm undertaken normally without expectation of fee and not in the course of ordinary commercial practice and consisting of

(a) the delivery of legal services to persons of limited means or to charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters which are designed primarily to address the needs of persons of limited means;

(b) the provision of legal assistance to individuals, groups, or organizations seeking to secure or protect civil rights, civil liberties or public rights; and

(c) the provision of legal assistance to charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental or educational organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes, where the payment of standard legal fees would significantly deplete the organization's economic resources or would be otherwise inappropriate.42

* Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P.

Alston & Bird, LLP

Andrews & Kurth LLP

* Arent Fox Kintner Plotkin & Kahn PLLC

Armstrong Teasdale LLP

Arnall Golden & Gregory LLP

* Arnold & Porter

Baker & McKenzie

Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll LLP

Bass, Berry & Sims PLC

Beckley Singleton Jemison Cobeaga & List Chtd.

Best, Best & Krieger LLP

Beveridge & Diamond LLP

Bracewell & Patterson LLP

Briggs and Morgan PA

* Brown & Bain PA

Brown, Rudnick, Freed & Gesmer PC

* Bryan Cave LLP

Buchanan Ingersoll PC

Bullivant Houser Bailey PC

Cades Schutte Fleming & Wright

* Carlton Fields PA

Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal, L.L.P.

Chadbourne & Parke, LLP

* Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton

Cooley Godward LLP

* Covington & Burling

Crosby, Heafey, Roach & May PC

Crowell & Moring LLP

* Cummings & Lockwood

* Davis, Graham & Stubbs LLP

Davis Wright Tremaine LLP

Day, Berry & Howard LLP

* Debevoise & Plimpton

Dechert Price & Rhoads

Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin & Oshinsky LLP

* Dorsey & Whitney LLP

* Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

Dykema Gossett PLLC

Faegre & Benson, LLP

Farella Braun & Martel LLP

Foley, Hoag & Eliot LLP

Foster Pepper & Shefelman LLP

* Fredrikson & Byron PA

* Garvey, Schubert & Barer

* Gibbons, Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger & Vecchione PC

Godfrey & Kahn S.C.

Goulston & Storrs PC

Graves, Dougherty, Hearon & Moody PC

Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett, P.A.

* Hale and Dorr LLP

Hazel & Thomas PC

* Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe

Hill & Barlow PC

* Hogan & Hartson L.L.P.

* Holland & Hart LLP

* Holland & Knight LLP

Holme Roberts & Owen LLP

Hopkins & Sutter PC

Howard Rice Nemerovski Canady Falk & Rabkin

Howrey & Simon

Hughes, Hubbard & Reed LLP

* Hunton & Williams

Husch & Eppenberger LLC

Irell & Manella LLP

* Jenner & Block

Johnson & Bell LTD

Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler LLP

Kirkland & Ellis

Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP

Latham & Watkins

Leonard, Street and Deinard P.A.

Lindquist & Vennum PLLP

Locke Liddell & Sapp LLP

Lowenstein Sandler PC

Mayer, Brown & Platt

* Mays & Valentine LLP

* McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen, LLP

McDermott, Will & Emery

McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe LLP

McKenna & Cuneo, L.L.P.

Mesirov Gelman Jaffe Cramer & Jamieson LLP

Michael Best & Friedrich

Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP

* Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone PLC

Miller & Chevalier, Chtd.

Miller, Nash, Wiener, Hager & Carlsen LLP

Milling, Benson, Woodward Woodward LLP

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP

* Morrison & Foerster LLP

* Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP

* Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, L.L.P.

Nutter, McClennen & Fish LLP

Oppenheimer Wolff & Donnelly LLP

* Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP

Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP

Patton Boggs, L.L.P.

* Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison

Pepper Hamilton, LLP

Perkins Coie LLP

Pillsbury Madison & Sutro LLP

* Piper & Marbury LLP

Plunkett & Cooney PC

Preston Gates & Ellis LLP

* Proskauer Rose LLP

* Reed Smith Shaw & McClay LLP

Rider, Bennett, Egan & Arundel LLP

Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi LLP

Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson PA

Robinson & Cole LLP

Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb PA

Rose Law Firm PA

Rosenman & Colin LLP

* Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell PA

Sachnoff & Weaver LTD

Saul, Ewing, Remick & Saul LLP

Schiff Hardin & Waite PC

Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP

Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP

Schwabe Williamson & Wyatt, P.C.

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge

Shea & Gardner

* Shearman & Sterling

Sheehan Phinney Bass + Green

* Shipman & Goodwin LLP

Sidley & Austin

* Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP

Smith, Gambrell & Russell LLP

Smith Helms Mulliss & Moore LLP

Snell & Wilmer LLP

* Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal

* Steel Hector & Davis LLP

* Steptoe & Johnson LLP

Streich Lang PA

Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan LLP

Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault LLP

Thompson Coburn

* Tydings & Rosenberg LLP

Tyler Cooper & Alcorn LLP

Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy PC

* Venable, Baetjer and Howard LLP

Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P.

Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP

Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP

White & Case LLP

Whitman Breed Abbott & Morgan LLP

Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon

Wiley, Rein & Fielding

Williams, Kastner & Gibbs PLLC

* Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering

Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati PC

* Winston & Strawn

Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts

Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice

Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs

* Indicates charter signatories to the Challenge.

1 See Ronald J. Tabak, How Law Firms Can Act to Increase the Pro Bono Representation of the Poor, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L., at 87, 87.

2 See Id.

3 See Esther F. Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: the Wrong Answer to the Right Question, 49 MD. L. REV. 78, 102, n. 22 (1990).

4 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1204 (6th ed. 1990).

5 The Pro Bono Institute is a recently established not-for-profit organization based in Washington D.C.  It researches methods and resources for providing legal services to the poor, the disadvantaged, or other groups or individuals unable to secure legal assistance.  The pro Bono Institute defines pro bono as follows:  "The term pro bono refers to activities of the firm undertaken normally without expectation of fee and not in the course of ordinary commercial practice and consisting of the delivery of legal services to persons of limited means or to charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters which are designed primarily to address the needs of persons of limited means; the provision of legal assistance to individuals, groups, or organizations seeking to secure or protect civil rights, civil liberties or public rights; and the provision of legal assistance to charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental or educational organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes, where the payment of standard legal fees would significantly deplete the organization's economic resources or would be otherwise inappropriate."  The Law Firm Pro Bono Project (visited Dec. 20, 1999) <http://www.probonoinst.org>

6 See NALP LAW FIRM QUESTIONNAIRE (Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty and Bennet, Minneapolis, MN.) 1999.

7 See NALP LAW FIRM QUESTIONNAIRE (Peterson and Ross, Cicago, IL.) 1999.

8 explain NALP

9 See NALP LAW FIRM QUESTIONNAIRE (Faegre and Benson, Minneapolis, MN.) 1999.

10 See WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE HONEST HOUR: THE ETHICS OF TIME-BASED BILLING BY ATTORNEYS (1996).

11 See Reagan McLaurin and James W. Pearce, Pro Bono Publico: Issues and Implications, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 63 (1994).

12 See Kim Schimenti, Pro Choice for Lawyers in a Revised Pro Bono System, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 641, 646-47 (1993).

13 See id. at 648.

14 See id. at 652.

15 See Lardent, supra note 3, at 88.

16 See id. at 89.

17 See Id.

18 See id.

19 See id. at 90.

20 See id. at 102, n. 22.

21 See id. at 90.

22 See id.

23 See id.

24 While the scope of this paper does not allow it, a more full treatment of the issue of mandatory pro bono requirements would also include considerations of the constitutionality of imposing such obligations.  For a brief treatment of this topic, see McLaurin and Pearce, supra note 11.

25 See McLaurin and Pearce, supra note 11.
26 See id.

27 See id. at 64.

28 See id.

29 Model Rules of Professional Conduct

30 See McLaurin and Pearce, supra note 11, at 70.

31 See Lardent, supra note 3, at 81.

32 See id. at 101.

33 See id. at 75.

34 See id.

35 See McLaurin and Pearce, supra note 11, at 78.

36 See id.

37 See id. at 79-91.

38 See id. at 79.

39 See id. at 81.
40 See id. at 89.

41 See id. at 89-92.

42 See The Law Firm Pro Bono Project, supra note 5.