|
||||
|
||||
A. Modern Success in Private Mediation
A. Attorney-Mediators and the Battle for Turf Seemingly, lawyers are winning the turf battle over mediation.54 This defeat of lay mediators is most visible in statistics on private and public mediation. The field of private mediation can be very lucrative. Consider the findings of a recent Georgia study where "private mediators were more likely to have a gross family income over $75,000."55 However, before readers who do not plan on completing a J.D. begin flying to Georgia to open shop, they should note the fact that "mediators in a private setting were most likely to have a law degree."56 Law students and recent graduates should also hold off purchasing tickets, given that most of these private attorney-mediators were between "forty-one and fifty years of age."57 In fact, the only place where youngsters, aged 26 to 40, could find any measurable mediation employment was in the public sector. Even these public positions were few in number.58 B. Non-Attorney Mediators and Limited Opportunities
45 Robert D. Raven, Preface, in ERIC GALTON, REPRESENTING CLIENTS IN MEDIATION xv (1994). 46 Id. (describing the trends reported by private ADR firms, such as Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS)). 47 Kimberlee Kovach, Overview, in GALTON, id. at xvii. 50 Id. (noting that fewer than "35 percent of [] law schools offered courses that would fall within the dispute resolution filed"). 51 See, e.g., ANDERSON, ET AL., supra note 13, (same). 52 See Adler, supra note 6, at 47 ("Now, at the very moment when mediation seems to have gained some measure of currency and legitimacy, lawyers are stepping up to the plate top redefine mediation as an evaluative and predictive endeavor and partition off those portions of mediation that they see as their domain."). 53 See Ozzie Bermant, A Mediators Soliloquy (With Apologies to The Bard and Others), NATL INST. DISP. RESOL. F. 48, 48 (1997) (recognizing the issue of "turf" as "the perception that a growing acceptance of mediation is a threat to the livelihood of established legal practitioners" with the assumption that "since it is the court and lawyers who are asking the question, it is likely that they will be the ones giving the answer"). 54 See James S. Kakalik, et al., An Evaluation of Mediation and Early Neutral Evaluation Under The Civil Justice Reform Act: A Summary, 3 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 4, 5 at table entitled Characteristics of ADR Programs Studied (1997) (noting that in districts with mediation and neutral evaluation programs in 1992-93, lawyers and magistrate judges were the only ADR providers participating); Elizabeth Rolph, Private ADR: Escaping the Courthouse 3 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 6, 6 (1997) ("The private ADR caseload [in Los Angeles] is not evenly distributed among providers. More than half of all neutrals see fewer than ten disputes annually, while less than 10 percent handle more than half of the disputes. Nearly all of these heavy hitters are attorneys or former judges."). 55 See Goettlet, et al., Background Characteristics and Incentives of Mediators in Georgia: Exploring Differences in Public, Private, and Government Agency Mediators, 16 MEDIATION Q. 221, 231 (1999). 56 Id. To be precise, lawyers accounted for 75 percent of the pool, while 45 percent of public and 24 percent of governmental mediators possessed a J.D.. Id. 58 Id. Young private mediators only accounted for only 23 percent of the pool. In both private agencies and governmental settings, they accounted for 16 percent of respondents. Id. 59 See Rolph, supra note 54, at 6 (describing mediator statistics from the Rand Corporations studies of private mediation in Los Angeles, California) . 60 See Howard H. Irving & Michael Benjamin, An Evaluation of Process and Outcome in a Private Family Mediation Service, 10 MEDIATION Q., 35, 49 (1992) (noting a number of national mediation studies). 61 See, e.g., Kimberlee K. Kovach, Cost of Mediation: Whose Responsibility?, 15 MEDIATION Q. 13, 26 n.8 (1997) (defining a process in which "the neutral party does nothing more than broker a deal among the parties, more often than not through their agents, the attorneys"). Often these settlement brokers are more interested in settling the legal issues underlying cases, rather than "discovering the underlying interests of the parties or achieving interest-based solutions." Id. at 15. Compare with Deborah Hensler, A Research Agenda, What We Need to Know About Court-Connected ADR, 6 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 15, 16 (1999) (suggesting that "mediators [] deliberately activate th[e] stereotype [that mediation is more successful than litigation] in order to impress upon parties the value of reaching agreement" which may account for the high mediation settlement rate). This deliberate inducement may stem from the need to perpetuate high settlement rates for firms to advertise. 62 See Goettlet, et al., supra note 55, at 228 (noting that "[m]ediators seem least likely to continue as mediators for professional or material reasons" based on the responses to their surveys). 63 See Hensler, supra note 61, at 17 ("[W]hereas arbitrators fees for non-binding arbitration are usually held to modest amounts by statute mediator fees appear to be largely unregulated."). 64 See GALTON, supra note 45, at 160 (noting the fact that "mediators are adjusting up their rates based upon the amount in controversy" as one of several "abuses that are already beginning to infiltrate the ADR practice"). 65 See Hensler, supra note 61, at 17 (describing attorneys "strategic reasons" for favoring the mediation process). 67 See McKinney, et al., supra note 44, at 155-56 (1996) (explaining the results of a survey that the author was forced to disregard due to "the large number of undeliverable letters"). 69 Id. at 157 (describing a mediation center in Arcata, California "that relied on the American Association of Retired Persons" for its staffing needs). 70 See id. at 161 ("The greatest number of centers reported their key services as general community mediation (39 percent []), followed by court annexed mediation (29.5 percent []), family-domestic mediation (11 percent []), training (4.8 percent []), mediation-arbitration hybrid processes (3.4 percent), other not identified (3.4 percent []), and arbitration (2.1 percent[])."). 71 See McKinney supra note 44, at 160 ("[a] clear majority of the centers surveyed reported using two mediators per session"). 72 See, e.g., MURRAY, ET AL., supra note 32, at 77 n.11 ("Sometimes community mediation services refuse to mediate divorces when child custody or division of property is at issue, in recognition that specialized training and legal knowledge is needed."). 73 See Bruce C. McKinney, et al., supra note 44, at 163 ("The majority of centers indicated that they did not have a certification requirement (71.2 percent[]) while 20.5 percent [] did require a court certification."). 74 Consider the comments of GALTON, supra note 45 at 159 (observing that after "serv[ing] as a mediator in more than 1,200 cases and having created many institutional ADR Training Programs" he is still "uneasy" suggesting that there is a reliable way to start out in as a professional mediator). |